It argues that The next days, weeks, and months may, however, be critical because of a number of possible outcomes of the current battles:

- If Coalition operations against Sadr alienate large numbers of young Shi'ites, push the other Shi'ites clearly into backing Sadr or attacking the Coalition politically, or lay the ground for a working alliance between Shi'ite and Sunni extremists and insurgents, the US and Coalition task is going to become far, far harder if not impossible. In simple terms, if the US loses the Shi'ites, the US loses the peace and with it, the war.

- The US must be prepared for much quicker reaction to ambushes and sudden attacks, with the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage. It may also be sucked into reoccupying or securing towns and cities, having to chose between leaving partial sanctuaries and alienating those in occupied areas.

- If Sadr is arrested or killed, he becomes an instant martyr. If killed, the next Sadr is likely to emerge in days or weeks. If arrested, he must be tried along with his colleagues by a Coalition or Iraqi court many will regard as illegitimate. Months of political tension will follow. The situation will become truly explosive if the US causes clashes with religious leaders, enters religious shrines, uses force against a crowd, or produces serious civilian casualties and/or collateral damage.

- The fighting in Fallujah and Ar Ramadi has already created the image of large innocent casualties, a heroic Iraqi opposition, collateral damage, and US advanced weapons hitting mosques - an image that further links US operations and occupation activity to Iraqi and Arab images of Israel. The US will suffer a serious political and psychological defeat, regardless of the facts and its probable tactical victory.

- Almost inevitably, the broad distrust of the IGC will grow because of its links to the US operations and the effort to arrest Sadr and his followers while clerics like Sistani will at best be forced to distance themselves. The questionable legitimacy of an appointed and heavily exile authority will be undermined precisely at the moment it is scheduled to become the new government.

- The problems of rotating US forces will be seriously increased by changes in mission, and rotating into a relatively harsh combat environment at a time the ideal mission is civil-military and nation building. Building solid civil military relations will at best be more difficult.

- The rotation in of a new Ambassador and Embassy staff will be more challenging, and the ability to plan and execute a smooth transition will be more difficult.

- The return of a serious UN and NGO effort will at best be slowed or delayed. The same will be true of outside investment.

- The exposed pipeline and oil facilities of the South (many in the North are buried) may become a major target, along with key aid projects.

- The problem of Islamic extremism will be increased, along with the possibility of some level of Sunni and Shi'ite alliance on a foreign as well as domestic Iraqi level. The linkage between the US and Israel will be greatly strengthened, as will mirror-imaged hostile coverage of the US and Israeli occupations.

- Iran's role will become increasingly uncertain unless it is confident that the Shi'ites will be given security and the IGC and political process will give the Shi'ites power.

- It will become harder for friendly Arab states to support the Coalition and new Iraqi government, at least until the new government can demonstrate it has real control and a serious popular base.

- At least in the near term, the military legacy in the West and Sunni Triangle may have to shift to active occupation and containment of hostile areas. A far more difficult military posture in both and tactical terms. In the worst case, this could occur in some Shi'ite towns as well.

- There is a serious risk that the tactical situation could change to the point where the International Division in south-central Iraq loses some of its key allied components, and cannot perform the necessary security missions, and where the British division is overstretched by new levels of Shi'ite hostility. This could force the US into a significant increase in the missions its forces must perform.

- At this point, media coverage in Europe and Asia has already strengthened antiwar/anti-Coalition feelings. This complicates the political situation for allied political leaders, and certainly in regard to any possible role for NATO.

- At a minimum, the unexpected strength of Sadr's militia reveals a need for a much more intensive intelligence network to cover Shi'ite areas.

- The risks contractors run will increase. The question is how much?

- The American people and Congress now have to be persuaded to fight a real war in an election year, and deal with all of these uncertainties.

Everything still depends, however, on the actual outcome of the current fighting, and how the Iraqis actually react. Admitting that the situation is extremely uncertain, scarcely means that all of the problems listed about will take their most serious form, or that this may not be just one more period of crisis in a one of the most challenging tasks the US has taken on in its history. It must also be stressed that transferring sovereignty on June 30 can ease some of the causes behind the present tensions and violence, as will the flow of US aid. Once again, time is not on anyone's side. Much still depends on the skill with which the US and its allies execute the transfer of sovereignty, the aid program, and the political aspects of military operations over the next days, weeks, and months.