The following is a redacted text of the presidential daily briefing from August
6, 2001:
Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladensince
1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S. Bin Laden implied in
U.S. television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the
example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bringthe fighting to
America." :
After U.S. missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998,
Bin Ladentold followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a
[deleted text] service.
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told [deleted text] serviceat the
same time that Bin Laden was planning to exploit the operative'saccess to the
U.S. to mount a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Laden's
first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the U.S. Convicted
plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los
Angeles International Airport himself, but that BinLaden lieutenant Abu Zubaydah
encouraged him and helped facilitate theoperation. Ressam also said that in 1998
Abu Zubaydah was planning hisown U.S. attack.
Ressam says Bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation.
Although Bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he preparesoperations years in
advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveilled our
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the
Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.
AI Qaeda members -- including same who are U.S. citizens -- have resided in
and traveled to the U.S. for years, and the group apparently maintains asupport
structure that could aid attacks.
Two Al Qaeda members found guiltyin the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in
East Africa were U.S. citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in
the mid-1990s.
A clandestine sourcesaid in 1998 that a Bin Laden cell in New Yorkwas
recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.
We havenot been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat
reporting, such as that from a [deleted text] service in 1998 saying that Bin
Laden wanted to hijack a U.S. aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh"
'Umar' Abd aI-Rahman and other U.S.-held extremists.
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns ofsuspicious
activity in this country consistent with preparations forhijackings or other
types of attacks, including recent surveillance offederal buildings in New York.
The FBI is conducting approximately 70 investigations throughout the U.S.
that it considers Bin Laden-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to
our embassy in the UAE in May sayingthat a group or Bin Laden supporters was in
the U.S. planning attacks with explosives.
Fact Sheet
The August 6, 2001 Pdb · the August 6, 2001 Pdb Item Entitled
"bin Ladin Determined to Strike
in US" was prepared in response to questions asked by the President about the
possibility of attacks by al-Qaida inside the United States. The PDB article did
not warn of the 9-11 attacks. Although the PDB referred to the possibility of
hijackings, it did not discuss the possible use of planes as weapons. The PDB
was based largely on background information about past terrorist attacks
conducted by al-Qaida and general threats from the late 1990s. The only recent
information concerning possible current activities in the PDB related to two
incidents. There is no information that either incident was related to the 9-11
attacks.
Q: Why was this PDB prepared?
DCI Tenet has already described the genesis of this PDB item in a letter to
the 9-11 Commission dated March 26, 2004. This PDB item was prepared in response
to questions President Bush asked his PDB briefer. The President had seen
previous intelligence reports about possible al-Qa'ida threats to U.S. targets
outside the United States. The President had asked whether any of the
information pointed to a possible attack inside the United States. When this PDB
item was presented to the President on August 6, 2001, his PDB briefer told him
that it was prepared in response to the President's previous questions.
Q: What information does this PDB item contain?
The article advised the President of what was publicly well-known: that Bin
Ladin had a desire to attack inside the United States. Bin Ladin had stated
publicly in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would try to "bring the fighting to
America." Most of the information in the article was an analysis of previous
terrorist attacks by al-Qaida and a summary and discussion of general threat
reporting from the late 1990s. The draft was prepared by CIA after consultation
with an FBI analyst.
Q: Did the PDB item include any warning of the 9-11 attack?
No. The only recent information concerning possible current activities in the
PDB related to two incidents. There is no information that either incident was
related to the 9-11 attacks. The first incident involved suspected "recent
surveillance of federal buildings in New York." This information was based on a
report that two Yemeni men had been seen taking photographs of buildings at
Federal Plaza in New York. The FBI later interviewed the men and determined that
their conduct was consistent with tourist activity and the FBI's investigation
identified no link to terrorism. The second incident involved a call made on May
15, 2001 by an unidentified individual to the U.S. Embassy in the UAE "saying
that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with
explosives." The caller did not say where or when the attacks might occur. o On
May 17, 2001, the NSC's counterterrorism staff convened the Counterterrorism
Security Group, whose members include State, DoD, JCS, DoJ, FBI, and CIA, and
reviewed the information provided by the caller. o The information was also
shared with Customs, INS, and FAA. o The PDB article advised the President that
CIA and FBI were investigating the information. o We had no information, either
before or after 9/11, that connects the caller's information with the 9/11
attacks.
Q: The PDB item stated that "al-Qa'ida members have resided in or traveled to
the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that
could aid attacks." Was this new information and what was being done about it?
The presence of individuals associated or affiliated with al-Qaida in the
United States was not new information. This information had been well-known to
the intelligence and law enforcement communities for a number of years. The FBI
was actively investigating individuals associated or affiliated with al-Qaida in
the United States -- a fact noted in the PDB article. As also noted in the PDB
article, the FBI was conducting approximately 70 full-field Bin-Laden-related
investigations.
Q: Why is the term "patterns of suspicious activity" used in the PDB and what
does it refer to?
The CIA author of the PDB item judged, after consulting an FBI colleague,
that there were suspicious patterns of activity that were worrisome, even though
nothing pointed to a specific operation in a specific location. o In that vein,
the author was concerned that one of the East African bombing defendants had
told FBI officers earlier in 2001 that Bin Laden would retaliate if the
defendants in the trial were convicted -- four were convicted in New York on May
29 -- with a major attack, something the FBI interpreted to mean possibly in the
United States. o In addition, the CIA author understood that there had been
possible recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York. Except for the
information relating to the possible surveillance of federal buildings in New
York, which was later determined by the FBI to be consistent with
tourist-related activity, the PDB item contained no information from FBI
investigations that indicated activities related to the preparation or planning
for hijackings or other attacks within the United States. None of the
information relating to the "patterns of suspicious activity" was later deemed
to be related to the 9-11 attacks. From June through September, the FAA and FBI
issued a number of warnings about the possibility of terrorist attacks. FAA
warnings included specific warnings about the possibility of a hijacking to free
imprisoned al-Qaida members inside the United States and the possibility of
attacks in response to law enforcement actions against al-Qaida members.
Q: Why has information been redacted from the PDB?
The copy of the PDB that has been released is a copy of the PDB prepared for
the President, except that three redactions have been made to protect the names
of foreign governments that provided information to CIA.