rather than just with the comparatively narrow set of views in "Democracy Now", and you get more of a sense of exactly how far some people are willing to go:

------------------------------------------------

_{When the Profile Fits the Crime}

PAUL SPERRY | July 28 | NYT

Paul Sperry, a Hoover Institution media fellow, is the author of "Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives Have Penetrated Washington."

------------------------------------------------

I have to say that even with the London bombings I feel much safer on the bus and in the subways with or without searches than I would on America's highways, where road rage and drunk driving are more socially acceptable forms of terrorism.

If terrorism is meant to make me do something different, then the terrorists have failed at that!

http://peakoilnyc.blogspot.com/2005/07/illusion-of-safety-overtakes-motorists.html

The searches are random.  And one has the option of refusing the search, but then is required to leave the subway.  Current law in NYC prevents racial profiling.

Supporters say that the searches dissuade would be terrorists by their very presence.  Casing the system would be made harder undetected, and having real eyes and ears on the problem increases the chance the bad guys would be caught in a slip up.  Searching could only help, right?

Opponents point to a history of racial profiling in NYC.  Since one can refuse the search, they ask what prevents a bomber from going to the next stop repeatedly until he is successful?  London has not instituted a random search of their transit system.  Airport TSA random searches have stopped.  The argument is that random searches are ineffectual, siphoning money and manpower away from more productive uses.

Is this a matter of balancing the Constitution with public safety?  Or is it a way for authorities to show the public that they are doing something tangible?

BTW, NYC has the best counter-terrorism unit in the country.  They meet at One Police Plaza every morning in the executive command center.  The principles are Raymond Kelly, NYC Police Commissioner; David Cohen, Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence: and Michael Sheehan, Deputy Commissioner for Counter terrorism. But the work they do isn't seen, nor is it meant to be seen, by the general public.

Arta's post, Defending the City, is a Q&A with author William Finnegan of The New Yorker.  The current issue contains his lengthy and sophisticated piece detailing their daily grind protecting the city.  Finnegan was allowed to sit and listen one morning.  Great article.

Would you mind being searched?  What if you were searched 4 times in a week while your co-workers say they have yet to be patted down as you arrived  -late for work?  Would seeing the police presence make you feel safer?

...worldwise. It's about feeling safe, effective or not.

I suicide bomber with his finger on the button could do just as much damage in a crow queing up to be searched as in the subway itself don't you think?

If the bomber thinks he's about to be searched and his already standing in a crowd.......

Know what I mean?

Caribdude

Would it have caught the London folks, from what I have read-no.  Unless you profiled all Moslems.

Second, a devious foe, would have a lot of Moslem men wear perfume and mutter prayers in the subway over a period of time, thus confusing law enforcement and overburdening the system.  

Of course it is better than nothing.  

Neither.  Rather, it's merely ineffective.  It seems to me more of a reassurance measure.  It's simply unworkable to have airport-style security in subway systems.  I think Amy was looking through the wrong lens.

Securing Our Subways

By Michael Chertoff

Friday, July 29, 2005; Page A23

In the past couple of weeks we have seen four major terrorist attacks on soft targets in civilian areas: two attacks on mass transit in London; an attack on a shopping mall in Netanya, Israel; and an attack on hotels and resorts in Egypt. The events are a tragic reminder of the dangers we face, the tactics of our enemies and the need for more preparedness.

Every act of terrorism is unforgivable, and any life taken by terrorists is an irreparable loss. This is why we have gone to great lengths as a nation since Sept. 11 to provide law enforcement and intelligence personnel with enhanced tools and information to better identify, track and apprehend terrorists before they are able to strike. We have also made significant progress since last year's bombings in Madrid in securing our mass transit systems.

State and local authorities have received more than $8 billion in Homeland Security Department grants that can be used for mass transit security, and President Bush has proposed an additional $2.4 billion in his 2006 budget. The federal government has chipped in more than $255 million for state and local transit authorities to increase protection through hardening of assets, greater police presence during high alerts, additional detection and surveillance equipment, increased inspections, and expanded use of explosives-sniffing dog teams.

These expenditures reflect our commitment to protecting all of our infrastructure from terrorist attack. Of course, the way in which we do so depends on the nature of the system that we are protecting. Mass transit is an open, accessible and efficient system across a broad geographic area. By contrast, our aviation system is a closed system that can be tightly monitored at controlled checkpoints. An airport-style security system would be poorly suited to local mass transit systems because long delays would interrupt fluidity and convenience. We cannot destroy with draconian security measures the very thing we are trying to protect.

While securing our subways, buses and rail systems remains a critical effort, it has never been solely or even primarily a federal effort. State and local officials rightly control almost all of the "boots on the ground" used to provide security for mass transit. Indeed, these highly trained local law enforcement personnel understand the unique design characteristics and security challenges of their hometown subway, light rail, bus and ferry systems better than anyone.

To make mass transit systems more secure, we need an effective partnership between federal, state and local officials that builds on the strengths and resources each can offer -- and that reflects the individual architecture of each local system. Here are three suggestions for strengthening the federal role in mass transit security while preserving our partnership with our state and local counterparts:

· We must use real-time intelligence and the experience gained from London and Madrid to improve our protective measures. Steps taken to identify and intercept sleeper cells and to secure our borders strengthen mass transit security and our entire infrastructure.

· We should not automatically focus all our resources and attention on subway trains and buses just because the terrorists in London targeted subway trains and buses. The attack on hotels and resorts in Egypt shows that terrorists are interested in other "soft" targets as well. Even within the mass transit sector, we need to think about other elements of the system, such as tunnels and ferries.

why not? we did for planes~ candy

For this reason, the Bush administration has proposed $600 million in Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP) grants, which will give our states, cities and counties discretion in how they provide protection for mass transit and other critical infrastructure. As Congress debates homeland security funding, it should build on the model of the TIPP grants and give maximum flexibility to allocate grants according to risk, rather than dividing money into categories based on the latest attack.

· Finally, catastrophic attacks on mass transit infrastructure have the potential to kill thousands -- and preventing them must be a primary focus of federal resources. A chemical, radiological or biological attack on mass transit could cripple the system. We must expedite research and development of more advanced equipment to detect chemical, radiological and biological substances so we can stay ahead of the terrorists' intent to unleash mass casualty attacks.

No amount of security can guarantee 100 percent safety, which is why we are applying a risk-based approach to our homeland security efforts. But working with our state and local partners, we can build on each other's strengths to make our mass transit systems as safe as possible.

The writer is the U.S. secretary of homeland security.

SUSPECT HELD IN ROME'

The fourth and last London bomb suspect has been arrested in Rome, according to reports from Italy.

Reports claimed the Italian Interior Ministry said the man has been held in the city.

The man was named as Somali national Osman Hussein.

"The arrest took place a short while ago in Rome of the Somalian, Osman Hussein, a naturalized British citizen, the fourth attacker in the London on July 21," Italy's interior minister Giuseppe Pisanu said in a statement.

It is believed the suspect's brother lived in Rome.

Hussein is thought to have tried to explode a device at Shepherd's Bush Tube station.

This week police released a fresh picture of him, standing on the top deck of a London bus while fleeing from the scene.

The news comes after two of the other four suspects were arrested in a series of dramatic raids in London.

The other suspect, Yasin Hassan Omar, was captured in Birmingham earlier in the week.

...that has disturbed me has been the zeal with which certain people who advocate them seem to be approaching their use to find things other than bombs.  To quote from Mr. Browne, the NYPD spokesman in the NYT:

"Obviously we're going to use common sense for someone that appears to be an imminent threat." For example, he said, if a passenger with a large package had both fists clenched, police officers would be justified in searching him. Anyone found to be holding illegal drugs or weapons is subject to arrest, he said.

Others have addressed the issue of 'common sense' and profiling.  This doesn't sound at all like the rigid 20% random.  But for the moment, I'm much more concerned with the 'anyone holding illegal drugs or weapons is subject to arrest.'  I'm not concerned that their holding such items makes them subjec tto arrest, but I'm sure concerned with how those items were discovered.  A security measure, of (at the very least) debatable constitutionality, put in place for what some see as PR reasons, has been (before it is even in place) 'extended' to another purpose - and has become a checkpoint for searching subway users for evidence of other misbehavior.  Illegal drugs on their person have nothing to do (in the immediate sense) with the security threat posed by mass destruction weapons.

That's the problem I have.  Once checkpoints like these are in place, and become accepted parts of society, then they can quickly and easily be stretched and perverted into instruments of control in other ways.  Before anyone fires this at me, yes, I understand that denying the government the use of this tactic may mean giving up some level of safety assurance.  However, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.  How long before I am required to present a national I.D. card to use the subway in my home town?  This is not the political and social structure I want - and while random bag searches do not, in themselves, bring in into being, they are a significant step in the creation of an infrastructure (like Secure Flight) that provides the ability to impose controls on my actions and behavior that I strongly believe current interpretations of the Constitution deem illegal.  It means that rather than relying on the difficulty of creating those infrastructures to protect us from abuse, we must drop back to relying on the integrity of every person and organization controlling those infrastructures - and no matter what party or person is controlling them, statistics and history says they will be abused at some point.

...and your post is certainly relevant. I used the Democracy Now piece as a starter and didn't intend for it to limit the scope of discussion.

The question will continue to arise though.  When is it safety, and when is it intrusion?

is just ridicule. If it takes me 20% more time commuting because they start looking at bags, I will be tempted to use my car ...

The whole concept of the metro is that it is supposed to be a fast transport which integrates into the public space. ..

...is a bit scary to contemplate.  Mr Hoover Institute would like to search people who pray to Allah, apparently.  How one decides which God is being exaulted escapes me.

He is right about one thing though; if a suicide bomber sits down next to you, the only that stands between you and a dirt nap are your observation skills and self-starter characteristics.

How does the perpetual war scenario play civil with profiling?  What happens when tactics change?  Add more response and stir? Or replace?

The quintessential slippery slope.

And using insurance companies to justify it fails to inspire.  Talk about a racket. Mandates for insurance, but if you ever make a claim, regardless of who is responsible, you're profiled into bankruptcy.  I'd say insurance companies argue against profiling.

But I digress...

"Critics protest that profiling is prejudicial. In fact, it's based on statistics. Insurance companies profile policyholders based on probability of risk. That's just smart business. Likewise, profiling passengers based on proven security risk is just smart law enforcement."

This is badly flawed reasoning. Governments are not businesses. Their "shareholders" are their citizens who are also their "clients"; this is usually untrue of most businesses. Governments are simply not free to use every method at the disposal of business.

The issue of profiling by insurance companies, if not totally irrelevant, could just as easily be argued as a case against insurance companies being permitted to employ profiling.

it is a simple statistical fact... There should be ways to take basic bayesian statistics into account without violating human rights...

that Democracy Now and the Hoover Institute stuff came out on the same day:-)

about the Metro evacuation in Toronto today.

Or is it too embarrassing?  It can't be worse than the NYC tour bus incident last week....

Despite all of my bravado, though, in NYC

long before terrorism, if I felt uncomfortable in a subway car, I used to at least try to change cars (most of the discomfort involved crazies- one started throwing lit matches toward my feet ,a few minutes later when I looked from the next car, he was throwing lit matches at someone else's feet )

Didn't know there has been something in To . Shame ? You know, I, in a lovely kind of way, hate Toronto. What a boring city !! I've been told there is a life in To but I still have to find it. Cannot be worse than Ottawa/Hull after 6 0'clock PM but well ... It's in another country anyway ;) The media are much more interested in this comitee report ordered by the Charest governement on the way to finance the "Baby-boomer" shock to preserve intact our health system . It is quite embarrasing for him that the report almost suggest that sovereignty and repatriation of our Ottawa tax would solve the problem, especially since the two other option are things they promised they will not do. Raises the sale tax and raise the electricity fees. hehe.  Bunch of amateur those provincial liberals are.

We have a Toronto-ite here tough who answer by the name of JPD ...

Toronto police investigate subway bomb threat

CTV.ca News Staff

The Toronto subway system was partially shut down for almost an hour Thursday, after police received a bomb threat.

Police closed Bloor and Sherbourne stations just after 10 a.m., after an anonymous call to the Toronto Sun warned of an explosion at 10:30 a.m. on the Yonge line.

The stations were closed for "53 minutes due to an unspecified terrorist threat, under the direction of the Toronto Police," TTC spokesperson Marilyn Bolton told CTV.ca.

Subway trains continued to operate, bypassing the stations. However, Bloor station is one of the busiest transfer points in the system, allowing passengers to transfer between the Yonge and Bloor lines.

Major transit systems have been extremely cautious since two attacks on the London Underground, the first of which killed 52 people.

Constable Kristine Bacharach told The Canadian Press the call was likely a copycat threat, influenced by the events in London.

"These types of calls obviously increase when things around the world happen," she said.

"We have a fear that we're going to get copycats and this is going to continue tying up resources and whatnot that might be better utilized elsewhere."

Police have no choice but to investigate all possible terrorist threats.

"The Toronto Police Service believes that it's better to err on the side of caution and we take all these calls very seriously," Bacharach told CP.

God I hate when they shut the lines in MTl . It happens all the time because the rolling material is old. The order for brand new cars and control system is on the way , but it will not be finished before 2010. If they start getting bomb threats in the downtown stations, because the way the system is done , it will jam everything. I remember last winter during the metro worker strike. There was service only from 4PM to 6 PM and I saw an proto-riot when they tried to close the station at 6PM ... The metro worker had to commute all the angry people stuck in the Berri-station  to preserve ... humm... their physical integrity.

except you were pissing and moaning about using a car instead of mass transit in this thread.

But I forgot, bah! rien plus! alors! :-) only Quebec news for you -

unless it's bad news for the Liberals- so no more Toronto questions in future, not even hockey.....:-)

much the same as generalising? Something that has caused many a debate here on the Agonist.

It sound much like me profiling all Americans as abusers and torturers, that I have to be careful in case they report me and I get picked up and whisked away in some shady CIA plane.

Again, just a thought.

Caribdude

"The issue of profiling by insurance companies, if not totally irrelevant, could just as easily be argued as a case against insurance companies being permitted to employ profiling."

Good catch.  I would add that while profiling might make good business sense, it is inherently unjust.  It is unjust exactly by the amount an individual's misfortune deviates from the curve.

In the case of law enforcement profiling this means you could unjustly end up like Jean Charles de Menezes.

...but I think profiling, using your terms, would be like this: profile for abusers and torturers and statistically you have a good chance of identifying an American.

I think the way you used it is a generalization, or prejudicial reasoning.

But at the same time I think you understand my point too.

Carib

...it's the implementation, imo.  Unless we're all bagged and tagged the profiling system relies on sound judgment, and integrity.  Historically, not particular strong points of the species.

Profiling as an excepted tool of government control can only lead to conformity by the general public in my view. Kinda like legislating morality; an un-natural forced adherence by action, the imbalance of which will lead to an opposite and equal reaction. Conformity in moderation happens naturally and can be useful and advantageous.  That's why it lives.  But we have enough of that now.

(too much, some would say. isn't that what the 60's were all about? rebellion against conformity? the squares never figured that out. they thought it was hooliganism. that's my recollection anyhow. :)

I agree, it's awful tempting. Fear will make it too tempting for many I think.  But I see it as exactly the wrong road.  

Bayesian statistics is about probability inference.  I can tell what will be, by what is not now. (uh, correct me, I don't mean to over simplify)  I see where that works reliably for physical nature, but how could it possibly for human nature?

(I've argued to have the cake and then ate it. Perhaps the good Reverend could illuminate)

...at all. To go from this description of policy: "In  response to the serial subway bombings in London, Mayor Michael Bloomberg prudently ordered the police to start searching the bags of New York's subway riders. But there will be absolutely no profiling, Mr. Bloomberg vowed: the police will select one out of every five passengers to search, and they will do so at random, without regard for race or religion."

to this conclusion:

"In that case, the security move is doomed to fail."

is to miss the entire point of the policy. This policy of random search is about deterrance first and foremost. Much of what we know about suicide bombing (and other forms of terrorism) says that deterrance works. It's certainly not foolproof, but it has been shown to work. We know of specific operations that have been aborted because the players involved were deterred by obvious and visible signs of security prevautions.

It is important to understand that your average terrorist does not have much offensive capability. Once they've blown their cover and are OTR, their run is usually pretty damned short. As a group, these guys haven't been renowned for using the best tradcraft -- look at the guys in London, you've got two cells with cross-contact between them at the operational level; that's absolutely insane if you want to run successful long-duration ops. The same phenomenon happened with the 9/11 teams. Their best and damned near only protection is to have their signature below the detection level prior to attacking. Randomness scares the crap out of them and any tango with a microgram of sense will abort and reposition for another day because they know that we can't stay at a high level of alertness indefinitely. The policy says that there's a one in five chance that the attack will be blown, and a high likelihood that the player will be taken and from there the network rolled up. In that situation, a smart player aborts - this business is about never taking an unnecesary risk.

On other topics, frankly, I'm pretty damned unimpressed with racial profiling. It does much more harm than good in the long run. It makes Confidential Informants more difficult to obtain, it makes members of the public from these populations less willing to come forward and make complaints. For myriad reasons, as an investigative technique, it blows. (Not least is the fact that we know there've been recruitments of guys that don't look like the racial profile. Ideas don't flow directly along racial or ethnic lines, and terrorism is above all an idea.)

All that said, it's important to understand that entirely proper investigations viewed from the outside may look a good deal like racial profiling. We know that criminal and terrorist associations frequently flow along racial or ethnic lines because of the personal connections that players have along those same lines. The whole key is identifying an individual who is involved - then one may very legitimately want to investigate along those lines. For example, if I have a suspect who is motivated to his actions by his particular religious beliefs, I will want to inquire of his priest as to how those beliefs were formed and may also look at folks who are associated with the suspect along that axis to see if any other folks that are persons of interest are in that set, but that's based on a very particular and personal set of associations with this individual not with any assumption about that particular religious ideology. I don't think that going out and "tossing the mosques" is justifiable (not least from a manpower investment perspective), but asking questions of a particular subset, where specific connections with individuals exist is quite justifiable, MHO.

for profiling of devout (or fanatical - the distinction between the terms is simply a matter of perspective) Christians after Waco, Oklahoma City, or bombings of abortion clinics?

come on. I posted the paper. It was a one hour shutdown ovr nothing really so big. I don'T think there is much more to say  about it.

I was talking about using car because of bag searching. Nothing related to To, just tought that if they begin to do it in NY and elsewhere, they would certainly envisage doing it here too.  With Ressam'S sentencing m they certainly have more security these days. And the way the Mtl metro is designed, it would be a total pain in the ass. I mean, my university fill and empty itself everyday by the metro, with people from alllll profiles of the world, alll carrying backpack or bag .... Imagine ! I'm sure it is the same thing everywhere .

And the thruth is it did not even made the news here and I learned it from you !

And sorry , I do not spend my time roaming for the latest dead cat chronicle in Canada.  I've no interest in Toronto as a city, I don'T want to go there or have anything to do with it. If there is something major going on in Toronto I will still post about it . Nothing to do with limiting myself to Quebec news . But hey , damn , isn't everyone here posting only about american stuff execpt some  people ?? Almost every one here are patriotic "gros comme le bras" as we say here , do I say anything? Why is it bad to be patriotic and care about it's own  nation more than others only when it's not about being american ?

Tell me more about sudbury,ontario, anytime !

Would like to be there right now ;)

some cheese with that whine?

You always show extremely good sense and present it well.  I realize you are responding to Sperry, but can I ask what policy states a 20% success rate when using random searches?  

And as a deterrance, would you say searching, of any type, is that effective in Israel or Iraq?  If not, and that level of scrutiny is unacceptably high for domestic use as of yet, how does that extrapilate vis-a-vis NYC?  

Also, at the point just before detection don't suicide bombers flip the switch anyway?  Or are searches only meant to dissuade remote fired satchel explosives?

The money and manpower spent on an ineffectual tactic is wasted, which means something else that is more effective wasn't done, given that both are finite resources.

I don't see how you can profile for Muslims, exactly, any more than you can profile for Lutherans. (well, you could check the license plates :)

if it's ineffectual, and known to be so, what does that say about being searched?  

In NYC one does have the right to refuse so constitutionality isn't an issue. This seems to suggest she was taking the broad view.

...the measure is ineffective. Frankly, I haven't seen anyone do that. In the article cited I see a lot of gum flapping by Charles Pena and Bill Goodman that is largely contradicted by the actual operational experience of the NYPD.

As I see it they have to prove that random searches, in conjunction with other security measures, doesn't constitute an effective deterrant, and I've yet to see any evidence from anyone of that.

What I was trying to say is that if searches are for show only one shouldn't be compelled to comply.  Random searches a expressly forbidden, no?  Due cause, all that? (where's a lawyer when you need one? ;)

...I think the reference is to the opt-out clause.  Reasonably, a determined attacker could probe for a clean entry under the current NYC policy.  That option virtually garauntees it won't work as a detterent or preventitive measure.  

OTOH, this would depend on how many opt out.  If many do, there is little chance a tail would work.  Otherwise, those that turned around could be followed and I suppose any attempt at re-entry might be considered 'cause'.

They have random searches at airports.

"The policy says that there's a one in five chance that the attack will be blown, and a high likelihood that the player will be taken and from there the network rolled up. In that situation, a smart player aborts - this business is about never taking an unnecesary risk."

is that if the player chooses not to abort, he/she has a one in five chance of being subjected to random search, given Bloomberg's stated 20% random search rate. That random search, if conducted properly (and that's admittedly a biggish if), has a reasonable probability of resulting in a live capture or neutralization before detonation, both of which are very, very potent investigative levers. Keep in mind however, that the potential of both of those possible outcomes in the absence of random search is effectively zero.

The one weakness of this approach is the possibility that bombers will then target the security checkpoints, but it's important to understand that if you do the checkpoints properly, the effective lethality of that attack can be diminished, sometimes significantly as compared to an attack on a train or even a platform. You can't stop being a target, but you can be a more difficult target, and you increase the possibility of getting something useful out of an attack attempt, quite apart from the deterrance value. In this specific instance, because it's coming up on the screen so quickly, I think the main purpose is deterrance, but it is important to remember that other avenues can be pursued with this tactic with time.

In comparative terms, I'm not aware of any specific instances of random partial search that we can compare this policy to. We can compare it to systematic 100% search policies intended to counter suicide bombings in Israel (and in a variety of other countries and circumstances countering non-suicide bombings), and we know that those policies have effectively deterred attacks. We also know that other policies intended as "shows of force" have deterred attacks, both suicide and otherwise.

I think it's important to understand that such deterrance is potentially a very valuable tool to reduce the probability of such events as the unfortunate killing last week of the gentleman on the London Tube. If I as an officer inside the system challenge a subject I am very likely to view them as less of a potential immediate lethal threat if they have gone through a security checkpoint, even one with 20% random search, because of the increased deterrance. That means that I can make a less conservative set of assumptions and means that I have to meet a higher standard before I can reasonably use potentially lethal force.

All four London bombers in custody after dramatic raids

By Jenny Booth, Times Online

All three remaining July 21 rucksack bombers are believed to be in police custody tonight after eight days on the run.

The suspected Oval Tube bomber and Hackney bus bomber were held after dramatic raids in West London today, while the Italian interior ministry reported tonight that it had seized the fourth bomber in Rome. They named him as Osman Hussain, a Somali-born man believed to be the Westbourne Park bomber.

The events mean that all four men suspected of trying to blow up targets in London transport on July 21 are alive and in the hands of the authorities. Yasin Hussein Omar, the suspected Warren St Tube bomber, was shot with a stun gun and arrested in a dawn raid on a house in Birmingham on Wednesday.

To have four live suspects, plus the rucksacks which failed to explode on July 21, is likely to prove a treasure trove of information to the police.

In a day of high drama for the investigation, the first person to be held was Mukhtar Said-Ibrahim, an Eritrean-born Muslim suspected of trying to blow up a number 26 bus in Hackney, East London.

Police sources told The Times that he was the man was arrested at an address near Tavistock Crescent, Notting Hill, after armed police and a bomb disposal unit surrounded the house. A controlled explosion was used to remove the door of the property, frightening people who lived nearby, and it is thought that a number of lesser explosions that followed may have been stun grenades.

It is understood that he did not put up a struggle. Witnesses reported seeing a man dressed in white suit later being led away by police, who were shielding his face.

Two hours later, a man suspected of trying to bomb a Tube train at Oval station was seized after a siege at a flat in Dalgarno Gardens, North Kensington. A second man was arrested at the same flat.

The area is yards from the Little Wormwood Scrubs park where a fifth rucksack bomb was found discarded last week. There have been fears that a fifth bomber may be on the loose.

Then, at about 5pm, the Italian interior ministry posted a statement on its official webside claiming to have arrested the last remaining suspected bomber still on the run. The statement on behalf of Giuseppe Pisanu, the interior minister, said that Osman Hussain, 27, a man of Somali extraction who - like Said-Ibrahim - was a naturalized British citizen, was picked up by Italian police in Rome in an ongoing operation a short while ago.

The statement praised the effectiveness of Italy's security services and of the international co-operation which had led to the arrest, but gave no further details.

Sources close to the Italian investigation say that Hussain was arrested in a hotel lounge close to one Rome's main railway stations, and that British security forces were involved in the arrest. They said that Hussain left London two days ago, and had been betrayed by phone calls he had made to contacts in France and Italy.

Earlier, witnesses reported seeing armed police outside the only entrance to Block K of the Dalgarno Gardens housing estate run by the Peabody Trust, shouting at a suspect named as "Mohammed" and "Mr Ahmed" who was holed up in a top floor flat to give himself up.

"They have their guns pointed up and they have been telling him for about 20 minutes to get his clothes off and get down," said Lisa Davis, an Australian woman in a nearby flat, in a phone interview with Sky News.

"They keep assuring him that if they do what they say and come out he will be alright. It is pretty nerve-wracking."

Shortly after Ms Davies gave her account on television, the Metropolitan Police asked all broadcasters to stop airing live footage of the siege as it was entering a "challenging phase".

It is understood that police had kept at least one of the addresses under surveillance overnight, and launched major operations this morning.

One witness, Nicolas Holliman, said that he could tell there was more than one man in the Dalgarno Gardens flat by the way in which police were shouting at the property. He said there were vocal protests coming from the flat.

Another witness said one of the suspects was heard shouting `I've got rights'. After some time, Mr Holliman said heard several shots which he believed were gas being fired at the flat and then there was silence. Outside the flat there were police officers and marksmen with gas masks, as well as a helicopter overhead.

A woman living in Sutton Way, North Kensington, close to the Peabody Estate, said: "I understand a bomb went off in K block of the Peabody. They got everyone out first and no one was hurt."

The woman, who would not give her name, went on: "The whole area has been cordoned off, including Ladbroke Grove. The police activity started between 9 and 10am."

There are about 350 properties in the 24 blocks on the Dalgarno Gardens estate, which is owned by the Peabody Trust, a housing association and community regeneration agency. A spokeswoman for the Trust said that residents had been told to stay indoors while the operation was in progress.

Neighbours near Tavistock Crescent reported hearing a loud blast this morning, followed soon after by a number of smaller explosions which police reportedly said afterwards had been stun grenades. There was heavy police presence, which included an army bomb disposal team.

A man who lives in a block of flats nearby told Sky News: "The first thing I heard was what sounded like a very loud controlled explosion. A policeman told me to get to the back of the building and so I stayed in the bathroom for 15 minutes.

"Eventually I came out and heard six loud explosions that I was told were stun grenades. There were a lot of people running away down the road in panic. The noise I heard at first was an extremely loud bang, quite different from the six volleys after which weren't nearly as loud."

Meanwhile two women have been held in dramatic arrests at Liverpool Street station in the City. One woman is thought to have been in the queue for the Stansted Express train, which goes to the airport, when armed officers pinned her to the ground. Both the mainline station and the Tube station were evacuated, as were neighbouring streets.

At Liverpool St station a witness standing yards from where one woman was arrested told BBC News 24 that plainclothes police "suddenly burst into the main centre of the station and seized two women.

"They pinned them down on the floor, put their hands behind their backs, put handcuffs on them and took them away," he said.

"They've now evacuated the whole of Liverpool Street station and some of the streets nearby. There are now hundreds of people surrounding the station who were trying to catch a train and can't get in."

He said: "One witness said one of the women was queuing at the Stansted Express ticket office and another said they saw a rucksack nearby on the floor, but I didn't see that."

He said he saw plainclothes officers wearing caps which indicated they were police. "Initially there was obviously a bit of chaos. They tried to push people away and tried to stop people taking pictures with their mobile telephones. They were gradually pushing people further and further back."

Until today, police had arrested only one of the bomb suspects who tried to set off devices on three Tube trains at the Oval, Warren Street and Shepherd's Bush and a bus in Hackney on July 21. Yasin Hassan Omar was shot with a stun gun and arrested during a dawn raid on a house in Birmingham on Wednesday.

Omar, a 24-year-old Somalian, is the prime suspect for the failed bomb attack on a Tube train near Warren Street in London.

The Metropolitan Police had issued a statement confirming that they had "conducted operations at two residential addresses in West London" in connection with the failed July 21 London bombings. The statement said: "Officers are now in the process of securing those two premises which are now being treated as crime scenes. Police have arrested two men at one address and a third man has been arrested at the second address. They are being taken to a Central London police station for further questioning."

The Italian statement said: "Congratulations to the Chief of Police (Prefect de Gennaro) and his excellent team. The arrest a short while ago in Rome of the Somali Osman Hussain, naturalised Briton, the fourth suspect from July 21 in London, deserves praise.

"The continuing anti-terrorist operation is being conducted in the context of international collaboration. It confirms not only the effectiveness of our security measures but also the efficiency of international links. It's a good sign on the day the (Italian) senate has approved - almost unanimously - a new anti-terror law. "

Italian news sources are reporting that Hussain told police that he was in Rome because his brother lived there.

to set up those safe security check point in Toronto or Montreal Metro. I pu you at the complaints office the morning it begins ...

To me, this is simply buying into the terrorist will to perturbate our way of living.

And what tell you that the ressource affected to random search could'nt be used in a less invasive way with a simmilar rate of success ?

"That random search, if conducted properly (and that's admittedly a biggish if), has a reasonable probability of resulting in a live capture or neutralization before detonation, both of which are very, very potent investigative levers. Keep in mind however, that the potential of both of those possible outcomes in the absence of random search is effectively zero."

Sounds reasonable. I can't recall from the top of mind that a random (or other) search has netted a live bomber or neutralized him though (unless they wilted and turned).  Perhaps it has. While capturing an in route bomber is a great coup for the investigators (if it has ever happened), absent a random search the alternative is shoe leather and intel.  We often don't know until much later how much was actually known previous to an event, if that.

I am not against searches per se, btw.  But I think they should be based on something more than PR tactics.  The reality is that we are vulnerable, searches or no. It takes sizeable nads to go in search of a wired bomber.

"I think it's important to understand that such deterrance is potentially a very valuable tool to reduce the probability of such events as the unfortunate killing last week of the gentleman on the London Tube. If I as an officer inside the system challenge a subject I am very likely to view them as less of a potential immediate lethal threat if they have gone through a security checkpoint, even one with 20% random search, because of the increased deterrance. That means that I can make a less conservative set of assumptions and means that I have to meet a higher standard before I can reasonably use potentially lethal force."

I think this is the best argument I have heard so far in support of random searches.  Good call.

...be for an alternative, "less invasive" means? What do you propose doing instead? Anyone can say that they don't like things and would prefer other alternatives, but what are those alternatives.

Contrary to some of the other things that have been done, such as having the CSIS boys go 'round and hassle Muslims in the coffee shops across from the mosques (and, yes, that that sort of thing has happened, counterproductive as it is), this type of measure does actually have a track record of working with minimal downside other than inconvenience. I assure you, a successful attack on the Metro or the Toronto subway will disturb your life a lot more than random searches, particularly if they are intelligence directed operations.

You did not answer how it would be done. If you transform the metro into something so slow it is not useful to use it anymore , bravo for protecting the metro if you chase people from it !

A little bit of a coincidence, but one of my neighbour is a head of the sucurity in Mtl metro and pretty much agree with me it is un-doable to begin to search people's bag in the metro . I don't know who I should thrust, you , or the people who deal with the infrastructure everyday ...

But now you change your speech ... If it is only intelligence based search, doesn't it send you back to the option a ?

As for intelligence in muslim cumminities, you are pretty naive if you think they will stop doing that in any way . There are GRC or SCRS agents undercover in my university already. They assist to course and ask such stupid question to look like they are students it's pathetic. People talk to each other and it was not long before they got spotted . Don't know if it was part of the tactics but it looked pretty amateurish . Anyway ...

Police have been dealing with gangs in the metro for a good while . Recently, all Metro security guard became police officers carrying guns. They patrol through all the system inside the metro and have been quite efficient at spotting, preventing and acting on gang activities in the metro. There is no reason not to invest in this force to give them more mean to prevent this things. Bomb sniffing dogs are great, can't we train more of those ? Everyone loves doggies, it is the type of thing that can be very efficient , much less invasive, have have much greater detterence power than random search.

X-ray of bags of people is systematic and could be implemented much more easily and be less invasive than random search because it could be automated. But that would be a costy option.

There is certainly a lot of other technological option that would not be invasive and give us the same rate of success. 20% is not much to get.

But still to me to pertubate our way of living because of some hypothetic bombers is just buying into what they want us to do .

...to deter without destroying the utility of the transport system.

"A little bit of a coincidence, but one of my neighbour is a head of the sucurity in Mtl metro and pretty much agree with me it is un-doable to begin to search people's bag in the metro."

If you're talking about a 100% search on a permanent basis, then I agree with him. As a temporary measure, I'm certain that 20% random screening could be done (lots of things that folks say are non-viable can be done if the need is high enough), though it would have serious manpower/cost ramifications and would seriously impair response in other areas. It's very difficult to compare effective manning levels between the cities involved here, due to the differences in the crime rate between the US and Canada. According to the latest figures that I could find (2003), Montreal has a population:police officer ratio of approx. 460:1, Toronto has a ratio of 491:1, and New York has a mind-blowing 216:1 ratio (ca. 37,000 uniformed personnel for ca. 8 M pop'n, as of 2002). Given those figures, I think we'd have a very difficult time sustaining it for any significant length of time (not to mention paying for the overtime), but if the alternative was closing down the system, I suspect that somehow it'd get done, by bringing in officers from other jurisdictions, if necessary.

"But now you change your speech ... If it is only intelligence based search, doesn't it send you back to the option a ?"

Not at all. Look at what they are doing in New York - that's an example of an intelligence directed operation. In response to events in London they assessed that they were at higher risk (probably more due to wingnut copycats than anything else) and they took steps (20% random search) that they believed would reduce that risk. I've seen nothing to indicate that these measures are envisioned as permanent.

"There are GRC or SCRS agents undercover in my university already. They assist to course and ask such stupid question to look like they are students it's pathetic."

I wouldn't necessarily discount the possibility that those officers are actually taking courses to try and increase their knowledge. I've done courses with RCMP personnel before, and while I thought they were great folks, they weren't exactly of the most academic bent. I may be naive to think that the int folks won't stop trying the "roust the mosque" routine, but they damned sure better start getting better tactics, because that routine doesn't help anyone. I think the tactic of the NYPD is the one to follow - recruit members of these communities as police officers, then you might actually have a clue what's going on.

I agree that the transit cops have to be central to any strategy (and in both our jurisdictions they are) and that there are a number of other measures that can be undertaken. The increased canine surveillance that you've suggested is a good idea, but it's hampered by the fact that it'll have much lower coverage than a 20% screen (and it's got a long lag time before it can be implemented) and it isn't as visible. The basic tenet of deterrance is that it is visible and that generally means that it's at least somewhat intrusive. None of these systems are foolproof -- to take a similar example to another that you gave, the x-ray systems and metal detectors used at airports. There are a number of ways of spoofing those systems to smuggle devices onto aircraft. The interesting thing, however, is the psychology around how these devices are used. I recall reading a piece written by one of the guys that was involved in setting up the system, particularly the detector loops used to screen individuals for metal weapons. He was working at one of the big national labs (I think it was either Sandia or Livermore, but I can't recall for certain) and as a rush project in response to the initial wave of hijackings in the late 60's or early 70's, they developed a walk-through detector loop that scanned for metal weapons and sent a number of them out for field tests. The feedback that they got back from the field was that these things were too good -- no false positives. They were specifically asked to increase the rate of false positives, both to increase operator alertness and enhance the deterrant value.

On another note, I tend to think that total screening with x-ray systems is actually more intrusive than a temporary 20% random search, and one that is more likely to end up being ineffective - either the opposition'll figure a way through the system, or they'll go onto another more attractive target that isn't protected by such a perimeter. The whole point of your criticism against the random 20% search is that resources used there might more effectively be used elsewhere. Believe me, this is about a hundred times more valid a criticism to be leveled against a permanent 100% x-ray screen. The effectiveness of the 20% random search is chiefly due to the fact that it is part of a dynamic system - the threat changes and so do the counter-tactics. Never, ever stay static - the bad guys love predictability.

Not at all. Look at what they are doing in New York - that's an example of an intelligence directed operation. In response to events in London they assessed that they were at higher risk (probably more due to wingnut copycats than anything else) and they took steps (20% random search) that they believed would reduce that risk. I've seen nothing to indicate that these measures are envisioned as permanent.

Well, what I undrstood was discussed here was to make it permanent. Ponctual random search or surveillance is pretty much similar to what is done now when they search a killer who fled in the metro or a rapist .

I wouldn't necessarily discount the possibility that those officers are actually taking courses to try and increase their knowledge. I've done courses with RCMP personnel before, and while I thought they were great folks, they weren't exactly of the most academic bent.

Nah nah nah, if only they came to more than a course on 5 ... They rounded every course in every faculty . They were not saying they were cops but well... But we never know who might be studying here , almost half students comes from abroad, and suspect could pretty much be coming from here. It is not bad they do some surveillance, but they has to be more subtle, IMHO.

On another note, I tend to think that total screening with x-ray systems is actually more intrusive than a temporary 20% random search, and one that is more likely to end up being ineffective - either the opposition'll figure a way through the system, or they'll go onto another more attractive target that isn't protected by such a perimeter. The whole point of your criticism against the random 20% search is that resources used there might more effectively be used elsewhere. Believe me, this is about a hundred times more valid a criticism to be leveled against a permanent 100% x-ray screen. The effectiveness of the 20% random search is chiefly due to the fact that it is part of a dynamic system - the threat changes and so do the counter-tactics. Never, ever stay static - the bad guys love predictability.

Indeed , the X-ray solution is costy and not much better than systematic random search , but the same arguments is good for random search. The terrorist might go to target not protected by those search . I mentionned this because I saw those type of system working well in some museum.

Finally, I would not underestimate the deterence power of dogs. They are quite enough to scare any dude with a little grom of pot in his pocket at the airport. Imagine some dude with 10Kg of explosive in his bag.

It seems the most intrusive laws don't affect them. Unless they are a democrat put on the "Do Not Fly List. ;) lol Living in the Midwest I notice that most people just shrug off the thought of losing personal liberties. I think it is because for the most part it doesn't directly affect them. It makes me think that is one reason why big cities are usually democratic. I think we need a new political party: The Party of Common Sense. :)

archived link for

New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/22/nyregion/22york.html?ex=1279684800&en=36a990ce6b39a2d3&ei=
5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss

in the argument that interests me most: the constitutionality of it.

In my own humble little opionion, I think profiling--right or wrong, worth it or not, pros & cons--is secondary to the fact that the Bill of

Rights ostensibly guarantees freedom from "unreasonal" searches.

"Probable Cause" is, arguably, the single most abused tool in the hands of law enforcement, from local town cops to federal alphabet agents. One lies, the other swears to it and bang...there's their carte blanche to do whatever they want to whomever they want.

Desperate times call for desperate measures but, as was pointed out above, when the framework is built, you know it's going to be misused.

The premise put forth in the times editorial is philospohically repugnant, but I'm edging closer to thinking it's necessary. If the profile of the bombers is so clearly delineated, what good reason--other than providing a facade of PC behavior--could there be to be groping grannies in the subway?

if they do that often enough, people will resort to driving their cars and that totally defeats the purpose of having mass transit.  So that is the trade-off isn't it?

And I saw earlier where there were questions about why the Toronto transit shut down wasn't featured more significantly in the news.  If that possible copycat bomb threat was broadcast 24/7, all that does is make the transit system a more attractive target for would-be copycats and terrorists alike.  So I don't have a problem with it being treated with discretion and I would be in favour of letting the police do their jobs with the least amount of interference as possible.

No, I don't consider the non-reporting a violation of my rights to know.  I knew the attempt was thwarted and that was good enough for me.    

...of the more detailed search processes for aircraft boarding are "random". That said, one of the indicators for me that the new security agency clearly had operational problems was when I, as first passenger onto a plane in Chicago, pre-boarding with my wife and then two-year-old daughter, was pulled out for the more detailed "search" which consisted of visual inspection of my shoes (but not lifting the athletic inner sole - duh!) and the copious electronics I carry (but not function-checks [i.e., verifying that they would at least turn on] - duh!). I was pulled for "random" search due to the fact that as first passenger on, I could be searched without affecting the push back time for the a/c. Textbook examples of working through the security process without having the slightest idea of what drives the process or what the threat was.

(Remember all you al-Q types out there, you want to be towards the tail end of the boarding, so that they hustle you through the system rather than seraching you, so as to keep their on-time rate high.)

From a legal standpoint, I suspect that it doesn't make a difference whether it's a fractional random search or a screening (i.e., 100%) search, so long as the searches that happen in the absence of probable cause can be shown to be truly random. I firmly expect this conflation of random and probable cause searches to produce yet another unworkable 4th amendment cludge, but given how screwed up that whole section of the body of law is, compared to its original intent, it could hardly get worse (he said, naively).