Let's consider the content of what has just been posted (with what I can only assume is Sean-Paul's imprimatus?) here at teh agonist:

So this post is advocating a better, more effective death squad strategy, because ours is so shitty?  Because I can't find another way to read this statement any other way.

So now Central America in the 1980s...what we did there was a good thing?

I hope to God I never read another critique of Negroponte on this site, because if this post stays up it will have lost all credibility on the issue.

http://www.bopnews.com/

that the US intends to leave Iraq?  The current administration talks openly of empire.

I suppose I should have been more careful with my first diary at the Agonist.

I was against the war.  I was against Negroponte's appointments.  I have written in detail and at length about what a reasonable, sane, humane and workable policy in Iraq would be.

What I was attempting to do in this piece was to point out the current quandry the US is in - that all the choices are bad and to point out the least bad option.   I am trying to make people think.  If you have a better option, I honestly want to hear it.  

Now, I got raked over the coals at BOP for not mentioning the leave Iraq possibility - but in fact it's in there.  If you leave, my best guess is that you're going to have hot civil war with Iran intervening on the side of the Shi'ites.  Is that better than the current trendline?  Is it better than giving the Shi'ite majority the tools they need to win the war they are currently losing?  I don't know - but I do know that leaving Iraq and having it fall back into the hands of the Baath is going to be - well, I'll have to laugh, otherwise I'd cry.  Likewise leaving and having Iraq become a puppet state of Iran!

If there was someone reasonable and competent in the White House my suggestions would be quite different (similiar to those linked below but changed to account for the changes that have occured since it was written.)  But we're stuck with Bush and his crew of incompetents and with the situation as its developed - a situation which doesn't leave a lot of good options on the table - because even if you could convince the administration to do something reasonable, you know they'd screw it up.  What you need to do is convince them to get out of the way and let people who have to succeed, succeed. Right now those people are Sistani's people.

But I'd settle for the US leaving.

A reasonable and humane plan:

http://www.bopnews.com/archives/000517.html#517

The case for leaving (yes, I'e made it in the past):

http://www.bopnews.com/archives/001354.html#1354

The Death Squad Issue

Is the government using death squads?  Of course they are.  Is the opposition using death squads?  Yup.

Do I condone the use of death squads?

No.  I spoke out when Negroponte was originally appointed and said "don't walk down this road".

But it's happened.  And the Resistance is winning the balance of terror - they're killing more government supporters than the government is.  

So - I want to ask you a question.  Do you think you could take Resistance sympathizers and members off the street (people who aren't fighting at the time) and give them a fair trial in Iraq today?

Who would be the judge?  Who would be the prosecutor?  Would they be allowed to have counsel?  Who would be the counsel?  Who would bear witness against them.  How long do you think those various people would live?

If the Shi'ite are going to win this war then they are going to kill a lot of informers, supporters and members of the Resistance.  And a lot of innocents.  That's what happens in wars like this one.  It is no longer avoidable.  I would like to say "they can win without doing so."

I cannot think of a way they can do that.  Maybe it exists.  Maybe the new government will be able to establish its writ and enforce fair but harsh military justice with fair trials.

Maybe - but I ain't betting that way.

There are no good choices.  None.  That's the horror of this situation.  That's what those of us who opposed the war feared.  That's what those of us who criticized the failure of reconstruction feared.  That's what those of us who angrily denounced the failure to send enough troops feared.

I don't like it.  I hate it.  I loathe it.

But when I look at the situation now I see nothing but bad choices.  There are no longer any good ones left.  

Tell me I'm wrong.  Tell me there is an obvious, or even inobvious solution I'm missing that will allow the situation to be fixed without causing a civil war and without anyone getting their hands dirty.

Because I don't see it.  I just don't.

I wish I did.

however,  I fail to see through the entire post how this improved Shiite deathsquad will better the future lives and freedoms of Iraqi Unionists and Women, just to take two groups that surely should ring some bells in the history chapel of the civil rights movement.

Somehow, in all of this strategizing, I merely see the sharp wit and poignant conclusions of Colonel Kurtz.

Do some here miss to see the forest for all the trees?

I am sorry, your argument does not convince me on a humanitarian level for one iota.

Please, do better!

James Bennet analysis round-up piece in today's NYT (article has some thought-provoking historical comparisons, too):

...Counter-insurgency experts are baffled, wondering if the world is seeing the birth of a new kind of insurgency; if, as in China in the 1930's or Vietnam in the 1940's, it is taking insurgents a few years to organize themselves; or if, as some suspect, there is a simpler explanation....

What is curious about the Iraqi tactic is that it appears aimed at creating active opposition. The insurgency is powered by Sunnis; the civilians they have killed have been overwhelmingly Shiites and Kurds. The goal appears to be to split apart the fragile governing coalition and foment sectarian strife.

Yet if the insurgents achieve all-out civil conflict, the likely losers are the Sunnis themselves, since they are a minority. Having governed for decades in Iraq, Sunnis are accustomed to the whip hand and may simply assume they will be able to regain control. Or perhaps they are betting that chaos will lead to partition, allowing Sunnis to govern themselves....

Yet it may prove to be one of history's humbling lessons that history itself fails to illuminate the conflict under way in Iraq. No one really knows what the insurgents are up to.

"It clearly makes sense to the people who are doing it," said Dr. Loren B. Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute. "And that more than anything else tells us how little we understand the region."

from

WEEK IN REVIEW | May 15, 2005    

The Mystery of the Insurgency

By JAMES BENNET   (NYT)   News

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/weekinreview/15bennet.html

I very much realized, that you were not "making a humanitarian argument".

That is a deep ethical problem that I do have with your musings.

"Better a low intensity civil war now, won by the Shi'ite majority, than a high intensity civil war later", so you state.

What exactly do you base this conclusion on?

Are these really the only options?

Most of all, you seem to sacrifice human rights and freedoms for a United Iraq and a safe pull out of the invading troops.

I am again sorry, your  model convinces me as little as the neocon model does.

I am sure, that you mean very well.

Some say that about the neocons.

Heck, some even say that the devil is a nice guy when you get to know him closer.

The banality of evil.

I think, every thought ahead should not start with American interests, neither neocon nor whateverflavouroftheday pseudo Democratic, but with civil and human rights above all, and colonial state borders as a subjugated perogative to that.

I am just not that hardened to the reality of mercinaries and deathsquads, and the self-fulfilling prophesy that these evils create.

Call me oldfashioned, if you must, I can bear that cross.

I understand well how deep the US has dug into its Dante.

However, above all, I feel for the poor Iraqies that this Inferno has been brought upon. The women and children and unionists and secular enlightened intelligencia.  What did you think would be the result of cracking down on the unionists in Iraq? That didn't happen in post war Germany. No, there is no easy way out anymore once the child has fallen into the well.

Like, none! No deathsquad of any religious ilk will bring humanity and human rights back now! That child is drowning now, and your proposed tyranny of a "lesser evil" will not resuscitate it either, but only further turmoil and suffering.

I understand the dispair you feel in seeing a child die. That is a normal response.

It is very hard for Americans to realize a point of no return with calm nerves.

Things are effed up beyond repair now, and your proposed way out is only selling snakeoil to the dispairing.

I don't mean that as a personal offense! I do know, on a personal level, you do care and mean well. I just very much disagree with your conclusions. You do not convince me.

I think you wrote a good piece.

Hypotheticals are worth consideration but the reality is what it is. We entered a war--created a war--we shouldn't have.

Bushco managed to force Democrats into this argument you present and won the election on it: We are where we are; now what do we do about it?

The American people fell hook, line and sinker for the arguement.

I for one favor leaving Iraq and letting the Iraqi people determine their own fate, by whatever method they choose. If they choose to do so by war, it is beyond our control. But maybe, just maybe, they'll do better on their own

Either way, it's none of our damn business.

Wasn't in the first place. Still isn't.

It would be nice to think we could fix the whole world. But we can't.

Let's take care of our own and offer support to those who take the high road in this world. For those that don't, we should protect ourselves from them--defensively.

This whole notion of going on the offensive and meddling in the affairs of others will create more enemies than it will dispose of.

And eventually we will lose.

headline story page A1 NYT.

RICE IN BAGHDAD,

URGES SUNNI ROLE

IN CONSTITUTION

__

U.S. MESSAGE FOR SHIITES

__

Administration Fears Iraq

May Miss a Chance to

Dampen Insurgency

BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 15 -Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew to Iraq on Sunday to urge its new Shiite-dominated government to greatly increase the involvement of Sunni Arabs in writing the Iraqi constitution, amid growing administration alarm that a chance to draw the Sunni minority into Iraq's new democracy is slipping away.

On a trip that underscored Washington's urgency, Ms. Rice carried a clear message: Shiite political leaders should respond rapidly and effectively to any sign that wavering elements of the Sunni Arab insurgency might be ready to turn to peace.

Ms. Rice, in an interview, said she had told the leaders here that their efforts to punish Sunni Arabs linked to the old government must "respect the fact that there now needs to be an inclusive Iraqi process and an inclusive Iraqi government."

She also warned Syria, accusing it of "standing in the way of the Iraqi people's desire for peace."

"There are very deep concerns about Iraq's neighbors,"

The warning followed a week of fighting by a 1,000-strong Marine battle group along the Syrian border. Commanders said that they had killed at least 125 insurgents but that groups of insurgents had also fled to safety in Syria. "Syria is badly out of step in the region," she said.....

cont.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/international/middleeast/16rice.html?

If Rumy and Bush followed the sound advise of using more troops, creating a force of occupation and using the Bathist military structure, Iraq would be a different situation today.  However, it is not about what happened but rather what must happen.

1. Increase the force of occupation.
   
   
2. Plan for victory not maintaining things as they are. (stop short forays, when areas are pacified, hold them with occupation troops).
   
   
3.  Use curfews and road blocks to inhibit enemy activity (IED planting) and also to show a presence to the general population.  Use night sniper teams and yes irregular troops to influence public opinion.
   
   
4. Pay security forces very well, protect their identities, remove their families to the US or a neutral country.
   
   
5. Engage the insurgents on our terms, patrol, ambush and for god sake bring in Heavy Armor.

As mentioned the choices are not good, but the insurgents must be forced to pay the price of their activities.  How do they pay? By being captured, killed or their families suffering for their actions.  They may be willing to die but are they ready to endanger their families?

General Sherman hated war and loved the South but,

we all know what he did and why he did it.

I agree with Mr. Welsh, with the exception of withdrawal, we created this mess and it is now our responsiblity to fix.  Lets not fail to remember the end result of Vietnamizaion. Fight to win not to leave, let the dogs out.

not the means of delivery, I first of all am not a victim of a "Neocon fallacy." Nor should you be critical of the Agonist in as much as it provides a platform for my opinion as well as yours. Open disagreement is anti neocon, yet you infer you prefer a tool used by right wing AM radio talk shows, censure the caller. The parameters of the discussion border the issue of WHAT CAN WE DO IN IRAQ RIGHT NOW. You profess I suspect a kinder, gentler message or method.  I however, as a realist, as a person who realizes that all men must at some time in their lives have to do or profess things they are uncomfortable with because they simply have no other choice. With all due respect to your opinion, I profess a proactive approach, as verses standing in the corner wetting my pants.

eh Candy! EOM (runnin...)

I'm kind of with Werner here. Having read a little about Central America and the "dogs of war" death squads that were funded by the US or US supported governments there, I am repulsed by the idea of considering it OK or the best of a bunch of bad options.

I don't have solutions or even any good "realistic" ideas though, sorry. I'm enjoying reading this thread though.

Caribdude

by the editors.

First and foremost let say that Ian's comments, and those of anyone else who wishes to post in the way Ian did so are welcome here. It's an open community. All that is required is a login id and a will to type.

Second, if a person who has posted is not an editor, one of the eleven names on the masthead, then it does not represent the official stance of The Agonist. It does not have the editorial teams imprimatur on it. We will make it very clear when it does.

That being said, I think Ian's analysis is well reasoned. It might be wrong, but it's well reasoned. That doesn't make it tasteful. That doesn't make it pretty. It doesn't make it wonderful and ethical and principled, etc. . .  It simply makes it an analysis of choices we have, of which all the choices Ian has outlined are really bad. Which one, at this point, is least bad.

It should also be noted, for the record, that I felt Bush's pullback from the first assault on Fallujah was a catastrophic mistake. So, were I to write a piece on what should be done in Iraq to win, remember, that is the main assumption here, to win, I would more than likely agree with the main thrust of Ian's analysis. I could, and do quibble with a few of the particulars, but on the whole, I think the analysis is spot on.

But also, remember this, were I the leader of the United States of America I would never have invaded Iraq.

So, I think it is very important to see Ian's post as an analysis of a really bad situation and not the advocacy of a better death squad strategy.

Now, I think an important criticism can be made of Ian, if someone were to choose to, that his underlying assumption of winning in Iraq, is perhaps wrong headed. I would disagree with that argument, but that is what I would like to see.

So, playing devil's advocate, I'll throw it out: is winning in Iraq necessary? And what would be the real world consequences of pulling out, unilaterlly, now?

I think that is a far more fruitful conversation to have.  

http://mt.skybuilders.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=3408

Do not apologize for your analysis.  Speculation is not advocation.

That some cannot step down off of their soapboxes and consider the Iraqi situation from a maximal-realist perspective is not your fault.  There are many actors on the Iraqi stage and not all of them are saints.  It is important to contemplate their next move and the rationale behind it.  Simply insulating one's self from reality will not solve anything.  

In the future, I hope that you do not censor your diary entries.

The humanitarian argument is as follows (although I wasn't making a humanitarian argument):

Better a low intensity civil war now, won by the Shi'ite majority, than a high intensity civil war later.

But I dunno.  Maybe Iraq would be better off if the Baath party took over again - at least they're secular bastards who left women alone and only wiped out the occasional village - and made sure that people actually got fed.  Maybe that's better than rule by religious Shi'ites.  But I don't see that happening, because I don't think Iran will let it happen.  

Sometimes there are no good options.  I suppose if you want a hopeful scenario I could offer this:  Muddle through till 2008, the Democratic candidate wins, the UN and major US allies agree to a huge peacekeeping operation and US troops are withdrawn.

But that's three more years of this, and I don't think it's sustainable till then.  I suppose it might be.

Ah - see, I disagree.  My guess is that if the US leaves, a good chunk of the Iraq (read, Sunni) army will reconstite themselves in relatively short order.  The call will go out, the unemployed soldiers will answer it, and you'll have large numbers of troops almost immediately, forming around the resistance nucleus of troops who have remained active.  That force will be stronger than anything the Shi'ites have (not sure about the Kurds), better trained and with better morale, with the possible exception of the Badr Brigade and Al-Sadr's boys.  Remember, the Shi'ites were always the majority of the population - and they always got crushed.  It'll be harder now, but the military expertise and most of the military personel - are all Sunni, mostly unemployed and mostly eager for a paycheck and mostly remembering the old days as the days where they at least got paid.

This is one reason why disbanding the army was so unbelievably stupid.

Yes, they have plenty of trained personnel - but that was for an army with armour, heavy artillery, com equipment, and air transport - they have none of those now.  The Kurds have some, so effectively would the Shias (I'm assuming they'd inherit the new Iraqi army).  The well equipped Sunnis had trouble against a weaker Shia militia in 1991. So I find it hard to imagine them taking over Shia areas even without US air support for the Shia.  If they did have to deal with US air power the Sunnis would be unable to field any large military units. They'd be reduced to fighting a guerilla war in the midst of a hostile, armed population.  Now that doesn't necessarily mean I believe that the Shia could win in the sense of taking control of Sunnia areas, but they might.  

I also think you overestimate the degree of success that the Sunnis have had against the US military - they're more in the situation the FLN was in Algeria circa 1960 - except that unlike the FLN they can only rely on some 20% of the population for support.  It's a bit as if the only solid support of the FLN were the Berbers.  I don't think de Gaulle would have sued for peace if he had the grudging support/neutrality of the Arab population.  And the FLN did have to deal with the type of strategy you implicitly suggest - death squads made up of relatives of the victims of the insurgency equipped with excellent knowledge of the facts on the ground, not to mention that the French had much better intelligence capabilities due to their century plus rule over Algeria.

There's a tendency to overestimate the power of guerilla warfare in the US, perhaps due to America's defeat in Vietnam.  Aside from the fact that the result would have been different if there were no NVA nor Chinese and Soviet support, the majority of guerilla army's do lose.  Whether it be the anti-communists in Poland and the Baltics or the communists in Greece and Latin America (only successs - Nicaragua and Cuba) or Malaysia (another insurgency based in a minority population).

it's looking it at a way I myself had not thought of, so I rated it highly.

BUT BUT BUT, you say: My guess. You are the president/general and you're in charge of this war, and you're going to base decisions on "my guess"? What are your intel sources? These are people's lives you're guessing about.

Did you ever think that maybe the way it works is that someone like you has already presented this position in a "round table/war room" and it has been shot down by others because of "this, this and this"? That there may be things involved in the calculation that we don't know about. Something about Syria for oneexample? That one should not argue for aggressive war/offensives, unless one is pretty damn sure that would help? Have you been "on the ground"?

The fact that so many other analysts are confused, while you are convinced, makes me wary. I would not "vote" for you is what I am saying. Armchair general is OK if you argue for status quo, otherwise, you take on the responsibility of the results. By opinionating on what military action should be without having all the intel that they are privy to, isn't this a mite like the Bush/Rove attitude: "believe it and it will be true."

No doubt it's partly wording problem. If you worded it as "perhaps we should be..." But you seem convinced that you are right, you see? I think that may be the problem that is the reason for some of the responses you have gotten.

...is that this strategy is somewhat staledated now. A year ago I'd have strongly agreed with you -- now, I'm not so sure that your reconstruction is what they're shooting for, presuming that they're going for a viable solution, unless these guys are playing a very, very good sneaky game.

I very strongly suspect that the whole insurgency was structured with the scenario that you've laid out as the original strategic goal. For a good long while, one of the things that I've thought  the int guys on the ground needed to be looking for was signs that someone was laying the groundwork to reconstitute the Ba'athist forces that they'd need after the Americans drew down or went home. That said, I think things have now moved past the point where this strategy is viable, and that unless these guys are stupidly going through the motions following a doomed strategy, they're pursuing something different.

I suspect that by this point, with the decapitation that we've seen at the top end of the former regime hierarchy, that (to the extent that the violence isn't being carried out by pure jihadi wingnuts and criminals) what they're going for is to spark a serious fight where they get some serious licks in and set themselves up for a special accomodation with the Shiites and the Kurds -- maybe something along the lines of a highly legislated political system like Lebanon where the Sunnis get a comparatively sweet deal rather than being at the mercy of whatever the former oppressed decide to give them. How realistic that is, I dunno, but I wouldn't be surprised if that's what they're thinking.

Right now, I personally would be taking a real, real hard look at some of these militias, especially the ones constituted around former regime figures (even those that tried to down Saddam) and that seem to be particularly effective. I'd be looking real hard at the ethnic composition of these units, because, if they're smart, the more Sunni dominated and ex-regime dominated units may be real "flexible" in how they take on the insurgency. Yeah, they'll fight against them, and both sides'll take casualties, but they might not be pressing anywhere near as hard as they could, and may be playing a long game when it comes time to cut whatever political deal ends up settling this thing (i.e., their interests may be more aligned with the insurgency than opposed, in the end).

Someone's going to end up on top of the heap, but I rather suspect that it won't be as neat as just former Baathist Sunni figures at the top of the heap. I think we'll end up with some power sharing among "warlord-like" figures of various flavours -- and that presumes that one can successfully keep the jihadis from tipping it all over into chaos, which may well be something of an open question, depending on how independently they're operating now. If they've developed an effective independent network, we may be in a whole different type of trouble than we realize.

for bringing about the civil rights utopia you speak of?

I merly am unhappy with a scenario that sets up the Badr Brigade as the new tyrant.

The underlying logic for a need of a new strongman, the Badr Brigade in this musing, is the rationale to keep Iraq together at all cost.

And the cost for this scenario is indeed very high, and will not end the violence as long as their is a seizable sunni minority left alive.

In fact, there is a good case to believe that a Badr Brigade run Iraqi state will fail and cause a civil war that might explode the entire middle east.

I doubt an empowered Badr Brigade could be corked up at will when the magic broom has done some of it's supposed work, weather in a Shia state with or without the sunni provinces.

And I doubt that the Badr Brigade will build a civil rights utopia in an Iraq minus Kurdistan. Because, what we are talking about is merely subjugating the Sunni, the Badr Brigade would surly not be able to conquor and keep all the northern provinces.

Concludingly, I feel the idea of a Shia death squad running a rump Iraq as not being a good core for any civil rights utopia.

Women could study and walk unveiled before the war.

Is it utopian nowadays to not be willing to settle for any tyranny that would be worse than what was had before the war for a mayority of the population?

Yugoslavia could not be kept together, and civil rights and civil liberties might not be at a level standard in all of the resulting states and provinces, but it is much better than being at war.

Read it and weep!

"All his nominations were vetoed by the more hard-line Shiites of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The real power in Iraq right now lies with Abdel Aziz Al-Hakim, the turbaned head of SCIRI and Sistani.

Some Iraqis disagree with me. They would say that SCIRI's power derives from Iran, and it is that country that is really controlling (or not controlling) the country."

http://billfisher.blogspot.com/2005/05/iraq-real-news-from-battlefield.html

And since your moral outrage Richter Scale finds Civil Rights "Utopias" in other people's sharp analysis, please, top your reading with a deep thought of Negroponte in Iraq:

"Rumor has it that he saw an American patrol passing through the area and pausing at the bomb site minutes before the explosion. Soon after they drove away, the bomb went off and chaos ensued. He ran out of his house screaming to the neighbors and bystanders that the Americans had either planted the bomb or seen the bomb and done nothing about it. He was promptly taken away. "

http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/2005_05_01_riverbendblog_archive.html#111506438245725553

WSJ 5/16 front page:

Rumsfeld's Push for Speed Fuels Pentagon Dissent

Billions Are Sought for Force

To Fight Blitzkrieg War;

Critics Cite Iraq Troubles

Who Will Repair the Sewers?

By Greg Jaffe

Website blurb: As Rumsfeld continues his quest to transform the military around speed and technology, senior officers returning from Iraq warn that the priority ought to be defeating guerrilla fighters, restoring law and order, and rebuilding nations.

available by subscription only @

http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111620795755934288,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus

For "guess" read - based on what I know of the situation on the ground, given what I know of human nature, and given what I know about human behaviour in groups - I find it very likely that the majority of the Sunni army can be reconstituted rather quickly under the right circumstances.

Again - most of the soldiers have never found jobs.  Most of them will remember the time before as a time when they got paid.  The core of the insurgency, as best we can tell, is ex-officers and ex-soldiers from the Iraqi army.  The soldiers out of work haven't been informing on them - their sympathies probably lie with them, and even if they don't, their self interest does.

Promised a paycheck and a return to the good times, and fearing a Shi'ite dominated Iraq with Sunni's on the bottom, yeah, I'm betting that you'll be able to reconstitute the army fairly quickly.

In terms of weaponry it's absolutely true that they won't have artillery or air mobility, and this is a big deal.  But they will have quite a bit of light and squad support weaponry and they may well be able to obtain much of the rest that they need from the black market - Iraq's borders have proved remarkably porous.  

I'm betting on them, because I'm betting that experience and cohesiveness will beat inexperience and an army which is fragmented in terms of control.  But I certainly could be wrong - that's a bit far down the road.  More to the point is that you're looking at a real hot civil war between actual armies if the US withdraws.

You realize, that you advocate to destroy the village in order to save it.

(paraphrase) " one thing the arab world respects is a WINNER." In other words, our ability to be distracted from the prime focus of victory by our manners is the source of our failure.  We must fight as our enemies do, to win.  Why aren't we winning?

Because it is political suicide to commit more troops, the citzens will turn against the war if their is a draft, any change would signal that our leadership had made mistakes and God help us we know that's not possible.  So in essense, the status qou continues for the sake of the Neocon reputation.

As to the village, I am sure that the village will be rebuilt as it was after the British, Ottomans, Persians and probably the Huns destroyed it time and time again.

The Agonist has indeed turned to the Dark Side!

Besides your gentleman callousness with other peoples lives and freedoms, you are handing the whole of Iraq to the Iranian Mullas on a platter.

No peace will come from that, thus your "Winner" ethics are nothing than neocon political fallacies.

Truly shocking to see how the Agonist has changed.

The Agonist has not changed, all OPINIONS are welcome. We don't just post what we agree with and quite frankly the opening post brought about a good discussion. That is what the Agonist is about.

I want to echo Candy's comments here: The Agonist has not changed. Perhaps your perception of The Agonist has changed but the general thrust of the site has not. Since the beginning of the war the purpose of our Iraq coverage was to provide a realistic picture of what was happening in Iraq.

And one thing you really need to keep in mind is that Ian does not speak for The Agonist editorial team. See my comments here.

And finally, as I have said, and Ian and others have said, ad nauseum, we opposed the war. Keep that in mind.

Candy, you are right.

point taken.

it is quite possible to have a proactive approach, not to wet one's pants, and to arrive at completely different conclusions than you.

And that I do.

that we are NOT trying to silence your opinion. It is welcome here and ENCOURAGED.

and thank you

I appreciate that.

I just could not respond to the "wet pants" bait.

That was a rather unacademic level, to which I cannot stoop.

There is a reason, why the British commanders on the ground take affront to the US policies of occupation.

There is a reason, why NGO's on the ground are appalled by the insane tactics of the the US occupation.

There is a reason, why the, perhaps indeed nationalistic Iraqi view of Riverbends comments hints on Negropontes Deathsquads already busy at work.

There is a reason, why the whole musing of a Badr / SCIRI terrorregime as being a possible amicable solution to an unstated question makes sense to some.

Because this very question is: How can the US win as much as possible from an Iraq that is forced to remain in it's arbitrarily drawn colonial borders  -  and that concept can never work without tyranny!

Now, some want to have us believe, that there is one position more favourable a dictatorship model than another.

Some even think, that one or another of these horror scenarios is more sellable for a particular party in the senate than another.

Some even find mockery feasable when convincing arguments elude them.

Such is the human nature.

Even If I was to wear wet dripping panties, the ideas of benevolent dictatorship, horror, deathsquads and terrorregime of a majority over a minority, will never ring the bell of truth in my cathedral.

But then, I neither live anymore in the US, nor has my moral imagination ever faltered.

The US army is good at many things.

They are awful occupation troops.  They're trigger happy, they're not willing to die to get the job done (sorry, they aren't, the ethos is that it's better to splatter and Iraqi family than take the chance of one American death) and they don't want to learn about the locals in any meaningful way, but are encouraged to dehumanize them.

If you want an occupation that is as humane as possible (and bear in mind that no occupation will not have bad things happen - that's why you have to be real sure before you go to war), then the British/Canadian/Australian model works much, much better.

The US army is still designed to fight massive conventional battles.  It sucks at this sort of warfare.

Nonetheless, competently lead, with sufficient forces, the US and British armies could have done the job - as they did in the Balkans.  (Afghanistan was a completely different sort of war - it was all about bribing locals to do most of the fighting and then dividing the country up amongst warlords with a nominal leader in the center who has no real sway outside of the capital.)