The theory which both the current government of Israel and the Executive Branch in the United States are operating under is that repression works. That given enough force, enough killing, enough death, that the populace will, eventually, accept.

However, with no economy to acquiesce to, there is no percentage in submitting to occupation. While Arab dictatorship and terrorism is abhorent, it is not, functionally, better for the majority of the populaces involved. Iraq was better off under Saddam pre-sanctions than it will be under the US for a very long time. The propaganda play that the US "liberated" the Iraqis doesn't wash with them, since they well know that given a choice between "Saddam and no sanctions" and the present status quo, they would take "Saddam and no sanctions" almost instantly. The attempt to frame the debate as "Saddam with sanctions" versus "US occupation" works in the US, since the American public had no intention of supporting a lifting of sanctions, but it does not work in Iraq, which saw sanctions as being imposed from the outside, after their government, such as it was, had complied, however unwillingly, with the terms of those sanctions.

The abject failure of the American policy to take into account what is, to the people on the ground, the obvious truth, has played into hardliners hands. Because given a choice between "American occupation and thatcherization of Iraq" - stripped of assets, laden with debts and owning nothing but sand - versus "Islamic Republic", the increasing attraction is to Islamic Republic. The debate within the Shia and Sunni communities is now one of tactics - should they wait for the US to leave, and then nationlize everything? Or should they drive the US and force sovereignty in a shape they prefer?

The situation in Fallujah is tense as the US continues to massacre civilians in its drive to exterminate the rebels in the town. Having violated basic tactical doctrine dealing with guerillas - Isolate, Concentrate, Anhilate - by failing to Isolate the guerillas, and then having compounded this error by using blunt mechanisms to deal with the situation, even US policy makers recognize the need for fig leaf steps. Fallujah is quiet - as reports indicate that the core cadres left the city days ago, and the remaining fighters are willing to end this cycle for the time being. However, an analysis of the casualty reports from hospitals indicates that the US has captured few of the core partisans, and slaughtered civilians in equal numbers with even potential insurgents. By creating an atrocity, the US has now set in motion a dominoe effect which will leave it without any base of popular support. The "We mean to kill the people inside." quote may well go down as the "It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." quote of the Iraq War.

However the "caretaker" fig leaf is one that has won wide derision in Iraqi circles - where the consensus among Islamic clerics is that as long as the US is in, it does not matter what they call their Iraqi facade.

All of this was optional pain. Laying down the heavy boot was dictated, not by military necessity, but by political expediency in the US. Having failed to take scalps in Afghanistan, the US Executive, headed for a difficult re-election campaign - needed to prove it was in the saddle and in command. A poorly planned and poorly coordinated series of missions "Eternal Vigilance" were launched, on the "sweep and destroy" model from Vietnam. Just as in Vietnam, these missioned exposed both flanks and rear to rebel ambush, and, just as in Vietnam, the best guerilla commanders were able to execute attacks which killed better armed and armored US troops at equal numbers to their losses.

The US then applied heavy air fire power to up the body count of enemies, but, at the same time, exacted a horrible toll on the civilian population that the guerillas were embedded in. This pattern, familiar from 1966 and 1967, repeats the signal mistakes of Westmoreland's focus on bases and control of areas, combined with "sweep and strike" tactics. The results have been largely the same: inconclusive strategically, combined with a disaster politically. The revolution in military affairs - the combined air/land battle plan - was created precisely to avoid the reactive, incremental and confused strategy of limited conflicts. The reversion to Vietnam era tactics, and away from the "Modern War" of overwhelming force, has underlined that the failure in Vietnam politically stemmed, at least in part, from the failure of the military doctrine which planners employed. In Vietnam, the alternatives were not developed, technologically or militarily - in Iraq, they are.

If policy were being formulated with an eye to long term success - rather than a mere vauge hope on the part of right wing commentators that in 20 years somehow this will all sort itself out - then there would be a return to the doctrine developed in the years after Vietnam, and made concrete by a series of weapons systems and alteration to training and organization in the Department of Defense.

The revolution in military affairs was cast aside for a "faster, better, cheaper - pick any two" philosophy. The US has for so long moved to a stance of tolerating greater and greater risk in return for lower cost, that it did not even occur to the US public that the problem with US war plans was that they were taking a horrible gamble, one which, if it failed to pay off, would create a permanent blood debt to be paid periodically. Even Maureen Dowd, Gets It.

So far Rumsfeld, and others involved in planning, have denied responsibility, and largely avoided being blamed for the failures in their doctrine and its implementation. Westmoreland denied responsibility for his part in the Vietnam failure, as did many other top pentagon officers of that era. However, in the strategic interest of the United States, it is vital that the public, at least the informed sections of it, realize that this state of affairs is unacceptable. The people who are paying the price for a risky and ill considered policy are the volunteer members of the American Armed Forces, the civilians of and in Iraq - and they will continue doing so long after Rumsfeld has golden parachuted to the talk show circuit, where he will tell audiences, most of who avoided service in Vietnam, how they took the big risks and made the hard decisions, and should, therefore, reap the rewards.