In April of 2003, the US Army liberated Abu Ghraib, the notorious prison where the elite of Saddam Hussein's secret police worked over political dissidents and potential security risks, and then dumped the bodies in mass graves. Mass executions and violent demonstrations were routine. al-Makasib was the Bastille of the old regime.

One of Saddam's last gifts to the incoming occupation, was freeing some 100,000 criminals and other prisoners.

Reports from Iraq now show that it has become a chaotic detention center and under investigation by Amnesty International. Salon.com called it Gitmo on Steroids. Near the international airport, it has become the City of Fear where the local residents are possibly suffering from Uranium poisoning. the black hole where midnight arrests go. Conditions have improved, from concentration camp-like quality, to mere Spartan prison level, but this is small comfort to those inside and outside.

That the rebels are operating outside of a notorious prison should be of note, and that they have control of the highway there, and apparently can at least strike at US helicopters, is of note. Tensions have been building there for weeks as Iraqi's have complained about the treatment there.

Rebels have been operating in Abu Ghraib before the current offensive began, attacking on 19 February and killing two with an IED on 22 March 2003. The next day, the US engaged in a mass release of prisoners - giving them only $10 to get home. It seems likely, from one report, that many of those released decided to invest that money in revolt instead, and stay in Abu Ghraib.

On April 9th, the Intifada ambushed a series of vehicles - the US claims only two dead, but Reuters says more, and Al-Jazeera says 9.

The fighters have been attacking the prison with mortar fire. And still have control of the main highway to Fallujah.

This area then is a focal point for anti-US sentiment, because it is now the site of a makeshift town filled with people who have one thing in common - relatives in US custody. There are, according to reports, hundreds of "third party" nationals in custody here. One would presume that these are the suspected cadres or terrorists who have come to Iraq.

That the rebels are operating with impunity here means that the native intifada has joined up with the elements of the resistance trained or backed by the outside - that Abu Ghraib has become an antiversity of terror and resistance.

The use of Abu Ghraib is a violation of basic security principles. The mixing of foreign and domestic opposition a violation of anti-insurgent tactics, which make isolation of those who are experienced from those who are inexperienced a key part of warfare. Moreover, mixing civilian and military prisoners is unwise in any event. That the locals, used to inhuman conditions which reached the level of crimes against humanity, are now rioting and attacking the US, indicates the amount of goodwill that has been squandered. It is a sad commentary when one is losing the public image war with a deposed despot.

That the US has decided to place its reliance on the Interior Minister with judicial authority, rather than the army, is a mistake eloquently critiqued - by our own State Department:

The Regime
Said Aburish, journalist and author of several books, including Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, worked in several high-level government positions that brought him into close contact with Saddam:

Without any doubt, everything Saddam did had Stalinist overtones. In particular, the reliance on the security system rather than the armed forces. The jealousy of the generals in the armed forces. The use of criminal elements within the country, incorporating them into the security system. And those people were sort of semi-literate thugs whose loyalty was to Saddam — without whom, they were nothing. And so he brought them in, he depended on them, and they did him service. Anybody he wanted to get rid of he got rid of.

The faith of a state should rest in its citizen army - the failure to adhere to this long standing principle of statecraft is compounding blunders already made.

That the Governing Council has offered Sadr's fighters a place in the army indicates that the US regards it as the dumping ground for unreliables. However, with numerous reports of Iraqi Police either not resisting, or even assisting, the intifada, makes it clear that this is an administrative and political blunder. Police and paramilitaries were, by definition, pressed into service rapidly, without sufficient long term background checks. That there have been defections, and that lightly armed Iraqis do not wish to fight their neighbors, is understandable - it will take a long time to create a strong and reliable police force which is adequeately trained by the United States. It is unfortunate that politics prevented the Executive from bringing in Wesley Clark before the invasion. His extremely efficient implementation of security arrangements, and long time involvement with attempts to create "peacekeeping" units, tactics, training and equipment - is sorely missed here.

Policy should be that the US would have shut down such a prison, regardless of the use of the physical infrastructure, and should have set up POW type camps far away from Baghdad and the hostilities, separated foreign nationals from locals, and military from internal security prisoners. This failure of administration is now close to bearing its poison fruit. Should the rebels create the conditions where a prison break becomes possible, or an internal riot feasible, then the reprocussions of having escapees join the intifada will show up in lethal ambushes and the spreading of the tradecraft of guerilla warfare.

The famous memoir stands as a stark warning to the impact that such places have on the psyche of a nation. And the advice best given on the matter dates back to Niccolo Machiavelli:

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

This warning shows how harsh measures are best executed early, and not late, while the fighting near this imfamous prison, endangering as it does the vital lifeline of the International Airport - may well add another example to the long list of follies committed in haste, and repented at leasure.