You missed the possible destablizing effects this could have on the region. A very large 'risk' in my opinion.

What category would you say it is in? Risks of invading or not invading?

Invading - Rewards:
How about freeing the Iraqi people from a murderous Stalinist tyrant?

A.) I would put that in the 'democratic instituitons emerge' column.

The biggest reward for invading is OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL OIL.

The Bush PROPAGANDA machine is so good that all of you forgot about oil. He really has done a number on your collective heads. He has you thinking that this war is about democracy, ridding the area of a tyrant, ridding the world of WMDs. Guys, hello, oil. Remember, the economy needs it, must have it, absolute must. We must have oil. We import 30 % to 40 % of the worlds oil. We are dependent on MidEast oil. Without it we can't even send a boat to Iraq. We must have their OIL RESERVES. If they did not have oil we would not care what they did.

Originally, I was thinking of this as a risk of invasion (the realist argument). If I remember correctly, Pakistan and Turkey both saw gains from fundamentalist Islamic parties in their most recent elections. A US invasion is unlikely to reverse this trend, to say the least. The risk of governments falling to Iran-style fundamentalist revolution cannot be dismissed out of hand. The consequences could be dire. For instance, if Pakistan's nukes were in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists, India would almost certainly have to attack.
The situation in Israel could deteriorate to the point where they feel they have no choice but to rid themselves of the Palestinians once and for all, transporting them to Jordan, for instance. How Likely? Who knows? But this is being discussed in Israel openly now.
How likely or these? Not very, I think, but at least as likely as democracy flourishing in the area. I think the dream of democracy for the region is a pipe-dream. In many of these countries, a 'free and fair' election would be won by someone more like bin Laden then George Washington, a result we probably wouldn't approve of. The opposition movements in these nation are all, for the most part, rooted in militant Islam.
I think the 'cowing' affects of force are also over-estimated. Look at Israel or Russia in Chechny

It could also be a destabilization risk of not invading but I think that's a result of loss of credibility, which you've already noted. For what it's worth, I think the repercussions of that would be less.

Ok, I was with you until the end there.

"Each of these has at least a 25% percent chance of happening, except the US use of nukes which is about 5%."

Huh? Why is that? How do you arrive at a figure of 25% for all of these things?

Are the outcomes on each of these issues determined by a cosmic 4 sided die? Wouldn't it be a neater dice throw if we put the nukes into the 25% column too? (I'd hate to have to pull out a 20 sider just for the nukes ...)

I don't disagree that many of the points you raise are valid. I do think that if you're going to toss out figures like that you should explain how you arrive at them.

Maybe I'm jaded by my time in the Beltway, but the real question is whether the invasion will help or hurt Bush in 2004. Let's assume a best case scenario for him--shock and awe (a fiasco in the desert will sink him faster than you can say "peanut farmer").

Will the American public be shocked and in awe? Or do we expect victory like Gulf War I? Will there be a sustained economic bounce? Or will there be fears of terrorist aftershocks which dampen consumer spending? Will the renewed focus back home on the gaping huge deficit, the tone-deaf tax plan, the privitization of medicare, the affirmative action debate, the health care crisis, the lack of reform by the SEC, the stagnant stock market--are those issues that help GWB?

What will the political impact of rebuilding/reconstruction be? What happens with Turkey encroaches onto Northern Iraq? What happens when Iran starts sending troops over the border to protect its brethren Sunni minority?

Will the Iraqis really be dancing in the streets? Will they be dancing in a few months? Will we totally screw the Kurds again?

I don't think this is a win for GWB. I think he gets a short-term bounce but then when the real death toll starts coming back, people will be more humble.

Strange that you did not mention Israel/Palestine in your risks and rewards assessment.

I can't help but see this war as an IDF-style operation...we seem to be taking cues from Sharon's treatment of the Palestinians rather than from our alarmed French and German allies. My feeling is that if the settlements don't stop and if the Pals are continue to be treated like the Cheyenne, there can be no reward.

Sorry to be picky, but the more I read this, The more I have to take issue with.

Under risks of not invading, you list "We might see the possible emergence of an anti-US coalition".
Under rewards. you say "American image improves globally." That seems condradictory to me. Anti-US coalitions are already here thanks to the administration's 'diplomacy'. I can't imagine anti-americanism will increase if we don't invade. Doesn't make sense. I don't think it will decrease very much while Bush is in office, for that matter.

I also disagree that the lack of a US invasion will lead to "A failure of the 'containment' regime and the subsequent re-arming of Sadaam". I don't know of anyone, France included, who is recommending that we just pack it in and let Saddam off the hook. The 'invasion or nothing' fantasy is something best left to the dittoheads.

Regarding Korea, this is precisely where a loss of credibility could be devastating. It may lead to 'better focus', but our deterrant ability will be in doubt. We're playing chicken with this guy. Not a good idea for him to think we'll blink first. This is the corner we've so foolishly painted ourselves into.

I did something similar the other day, albeit in a very different format.
But it's a similar "second thoughts/overview by a reasonable? partisan."

Check it out.

Oops. Mention of Arab-Israeli talks is there, under Invading--Rewards. Very sorry. Apologies.

"6. A jump-start to the Arab-Israeli peace process."

I guess I was looking for "jump-start to imposing a viable Palestinian state."

Also, Sean-Paul's Invading--Risks are so appallingly scarey, that I'm hearing a echo from the past...Let's see, was it "better Red than dead"?
Better pragmatic than dogmatic.

Going up against the third Great Religion in a thinly-disguised crusade by disingenuously calling for democratization, disarmament or what have you strikes me as a really, really bad gamble. I miss the good old days of peaceful coexistence and mutually assured destruction. Bring back the Bear!

I'm sort of with heretic...and here is my laundry list

I think the risk of an anti-US coalition is a risk inherent in both scenarios. No matter what the outcome of the war, it will take the manifest diplomatic skills of the Bush administration (snicker), and some luck to avoid.

I don't think containment is necessarily jepordized by not invading, either.

Better focus on al Queda, Afghanistan, and so on is possible, but not inherent, in the not invade scenario, and, come to think of it, is possible in the invade scenario, too.

Similarly, the Arab-Israeli peace process is a mutually exclusive event from the Iraq war, although I will concede that a winning US team would have a greater chance of success, but the wins don't have to occur in Iraq.

I don't buy that invasion will crack OPEC, that cracking OPEC is necessarily a good thing, that cheap oil will result from an invasion, or that cheap, as opposed to reasonably priced, oil is an unqualified good thing.

I also think that the strategic benefits of mid east basing of US forces can be realized by greater air and sea lift capabilities. It would cost more in the short run than invasion, but would spare the costs of "empire", which are not neglible, and leave us with greater flexibility to face future threats.

If I understand your comments on method, this is a census and synopsis of prominent commentators, not necessarily your personal take on the matter. That said, my $0.02US on the matter:

Under Not Invading "Loss of credibility" is put down as a risk and "Better focus on Korea" is a reward. I don't think these are independent outcomes, ie, the likelyhood of one is the same as the other. Handling the Korean situation properly--since on your view it is a crisis, and I agree--would more than compensate for any loss of credibility that standing down from Iraq may create.
Under Invading "Shock and Awe region wide cows Muslims extremists" is counted a reward. The current issue of Foreign Affairs has an article by Stephen Biddle (not available on line, alas) called "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare" that calls the efficacy of shock-and-awe into question. Biddle notes that the Taliban and al Qaeda were able to adopt countermeasures to distantly guided precision bombing with the result that fighting at close quarters became more and more important as the war went on. For Biddle, the close integration of precision bombing with ground manoeuvers, not precision bombing itself, was significant. Iraq doesn't have the terrain that Afghanistan does, so massive precision bombing may be decisive outside of Baghdad. But unless we plan to bomb Baghdad flat (who knows? we just might...), I think we should expect ground fighting at close quarters in the city.

I can't imagine what it must have been like to pour over newspapers and magazines for an entire weekend. I would have shot myself or lost my mind four hours into it.

Sean-Paul You say that too often "liberals" "deride" the importance of credibility.

Ok, I'm from Missouri :-)

Please prove it meaning:

1. Point to where liberals"deride"instead of vigorously rebutting and/or denouncing the "credibility" argument as utterly immoral. And let's stick to serious commentators, not entertainers, as great as they are, like Moore and Franken.

2. Point to a single unambiguous case where loss of credibility in an analogous situation to the present (and the only one I can come up with is the Cuban Missile Crisis) led to a worse disaster than being sensible when a given policy direction was found to be mistaken.

3. Prove that we would not in fact GAIN credibility by reining in a rogue president and his delusions of a "democratic Iraq" which I do admit to deriding at every opportunity..

Pardon my obvious, but approx 1/2 of Iraq's poplutaion is comprised of kids. What kind of "credibility" is maintained when you're killing and maiming kids?

nb to right wingnuts: You may not be familiar with the difference between "deride" and,say, "utterly condemn." Here is a dictionary definition, although I doubt the important nuance that "deride" encompasses "ridicule" will be apparent to you:

Deride

To speak of or treat with contemptuous mirth

When it comes to arguments as repulsive and empty as "credibility" to justify killing people, I find myself incapable of mirth.

Counselor: I think the markets big concern is the uncertainty around Iraq. The markets will probably dip at the start of the war, but once things settle, my guess is we'll be back into a normal recovery.

I find the idea that this is going to be a long and difficult war very hard to believe. I'm more and more convinced that this will be just like Afghanistan - the people will realize what side is going to win and what side will offer food and medical aid, and either not fight for Saddam, or actively fight against him. Considering the level of force we're bringing to bear, I almost feel sorry for the poor dumb s***s who actually try and fight. My guess is Iraq fold like a house of cards within a matter of weeks.

I agree with Jat Redding that planting the flag atop Baath party headquarters will likely be easy. I worry, however, that that will be one of the easier things we do in Iraq.

This is a fine geopolitical topic and thread.

Merely focusing on two oppossite alternatives [Attack vs NOT Attack], misses an opportunity to discuss the merits of yet a third, very plausible alternative:

Delaying the decision while massively increasing the number of weapons inspectors.

Read detailed discussion at Centerpoint

The conclusory paragraph paints the chilling graphic have all been waiting for:

Unstated in the analysis above is something which should be obvious to most readers:

With 100,000 or so UN 'tattletales' within Iraq, it would be extremely difficult for Saddam Hussein to maintain his 'stealth' existence.

We surmise that one fine morning, Mr. Hussein would not wake up, as ususal, in his hideaway-for-the-night, occasioned by the detonation of a precision-guided missile within an estimated fifteen feet from where the body of Mr. Hussein has been restfully asleep, the precise location of which would prove difficult to ascertain, given the gaping crater of approximately 180x400 feet where formerly an underground reinforced concrete bunker had stood.

Interesting breakdown. I have posted my thoughts on my site, so as not to pollute "comments' with long essays.

A: Shock and Awe will not work. Why? Because the Iraqi Army is already operating with cell phones and in school basements, often in civilian clothes. Anyone expecting them to be in their bunkers is insane.

Saddam Hussein has several battalions of troops protecting him. Including AAA batteries. So the idea of him being targeted and killed is a fantasy.

B: People are not considering another thing, one I think which really has to be considered: what if the Iraqis hold?

Everyone is predicting a quick war and what if they hold on for three or four weeks and kill 3,000 Americans. What if hundreds of thousands of Iraqis decide to fight for their homes, and all it would take are the secret police and youth groups to create a sizable resistance, forget regular army, and the US would be in a real fix.

Make no mistake, the Army's plan is designed to cause a collapse before the Iraqis can organize a resistance. The problem with that is it is VERY easy to hide 100,000 soldiers in a city of five million people.

I think we never get to awe, because of the riots shock will cause. The US will find it politically expedient (to save Mubarak) to curtain the second night of bombing.

C: Precision guided bombing has failed in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. They don't tell you that in the news stories, but the reality is that PGM only work on fixed targets when you can get the right bomb mix. For formations, especially in urban areas, they're useless. You don't need a lot of collateral damage to start riots around the Arab world, courtesy of the BBC and Al Jazzera.

D: Prestige, reputation, all bullshit reasons. What's more damaging: losing a little face by backing down and bringing the 3rd Infantry Division home or losing a lot of face when a battalion of that division is anhilated in combat. You choose.

Steve,
read this:
http://slate.msn.com/id/2079667/

"Loss of credibility" -- which Agonist lists twice or perhaps three times in his "risks" for not murdering Iraqis, is not ignored by liberals.

In the case of Cuba and Nicaragua it was called "The threat of a good example". It's well know that terrorists and mobsters like the US need to keep killing people to maintain their reputation for irrational violence. It's called "face" and I don't think liberals deride it. It's totally immoral of course. Is that what Agonist thinks of as "derision"?

But this is hardly the biggest risk of not murdering Iraqis. If the US wanted to save face they could go and bomb any country more or less. Iraq is being invaded for its oil. This seems to be somewhat noted in point (4) but it's not just about dominating the middle east. It's about dominating the world. Again this is a totally immoral motive. Again saying that the war mongers motives are immoral is not the same as dismissing them.

.