One of the reasons most Americans tune out foreign affairs is that diplomats speak a foreign language. What they say is often incomprehensible, resembling the precise wording of legislation more than everyday 'talk.' Of course the media's constant oversimplifications just makes things worse.
What's behind their precision in language? Like legislation, which is sometimes difficult for the layman to decipher, it prevents misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This makes sense in a field where mistakes lead to crisis or war.
Take the current Korean imbroglio: one mistake after another has been followed by a cascade of verbal calisthenics.
As I wrote here the Bush administration has gone from a policy of "we'll "talk" but not "negotiate", to we'll "negotiate" but never "compromise." (Never mind that negotiation in my dictionary is synonymous with compromise.)
A careful reading of this Joint Statement and this press briefing by head State Department flack, Richard Boucher, shows off the verbal contortions this administration is so fond of.
For a long time the administration and conservatives have been railing at Clinton for giving away the store. Saying things like, "the 1994 Agreed Framework is a joke," and my personal favorite, "it's appeasement."
But what should take its place now that the Bush administration has clearly abandoned it?
Oh, you don't believe me? Well, I'll let Boucher tell you:
This lays out the need for North Korea to come into compliance with its obligations, to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, to undo the measures that they have taken with regard to their nuclear reactors, but it also makes clear that there is no security rationale for the steps that have been taken. It makes clear that we have no plans to -- and no intention to -- invade or attack North Korea. And it makes clear that that the basic premises of the progress that has been seen on the peninsula need to be respected: The Basic Agreement from 1991 and the Agreement on Denuclearization of 1992. And it makes clear, finally, that the prospects of discussions and then of real progress in North Korea's relations with the outside world are there if North Korea is willing to abide by its obligations.
So what you have is, I think, the outline, the elements, the pieces brought together of saying that there is a way to solve this peacefully. And in the view of this group, and we think, others in the international community, that these are the things that need to be done to solve this peacefully."
Before we go any further I have an observation to make. Another interesting thing about diplomatese is that often, some of the most important aspects of any agreement, statement, communiqué or arrangement are not what was said but what was NOT said.
Exactly: the 1994 Agreed Framework. Boucher does not mention the 1994 Agreed Framework even once. It is a startling omission I'm surprised so many people missed.
And this is what the administration has offered the North Koreans as a concession for negotiations: the abandonment of the 1994 agreement.
Some Republicans might ask: "hey, who cares. That agreement was lame anyway; we can't afford to pay for the reactors or the fuel oil. Besides, they broke the agreement and they do not deserve it"
Fine, that all may be well and true. But in abandoning the 1994 Agreed Framework Bush has offered the DPRK a huge concession. The negotiating table is empty. We can start all over. Plus, we can say we forced them back to the table.
But the reality is different. This is a concession that the DPRK can use to negotiate a new agreement--a better agreement. You say no? Well, the DPRK is pursuing a dual-track nuclear program. That's double the leverage in my book. And we've already seen one huge concession.
Let's see what else Bush gives up.
Posted by Sean-Paul @ 01/09/2003 11:38 AM
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Comments:
"The negotiating table is empty. We can start all over. Plus, we can say we forced them back to the table."
There is NO NEGOTIATING TABLE. There are no concessions.
Here is more from that briefing - you read it all right?
"QUESTION: But, did, but -- am I not correct in thinking that prior to what the President said yesterday and what this statement says now, is that you had been opposed to any kind of dialogue until the North came into -- came back into compliance with its agreements?
MR. BOUCHER: We have said all along we were opposed to any kind of negotiation. We were opposed to paying again for the same agreements that have been reached before. We were opposed to ‘re-bargaining the bargain,’ -- and other phrases like that -- to make clear we are not going to negotiate to get North Korea to come into compliance. And that remains the position. We are not going to provide any quid pro quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations. But North Korea needs to make clear that it will live up to its obligations, that it will undo the steps, that it will end these nuclear programs, and we are willing to talk about how North Korea can do that.
QUESTION: So you're willing to go into a meeting with the North Koreans and say, "You have to do this, this and this." And that's the extent of the dialogue that you're talking about?
MR. BOUCHER: We are willing to talk to them about how they can meet their obligations."
