A few weeks ago my freind and fellow blogger Dean Esmay, during a heated email exchange about Bush's foreign policy, asked me "what would you have done differently after Afghanistan?" I told him I would post on it in the near future. And, as I try to keep my blog promises, I will do so.
It will, however, take more than one post.
Preface
One of the my chief complaints with the the Left in general and the Democratic Party in particular is that rather than enunciating a positive vision for America and the world they simply oppose whatever Bush does. This policy, as we have witnessed, does not win elections. Nor should it.
I spend a lot of time carping about the Bush Administration's foreign policy. I also vote. I also spend a lot of time studying foreign affairs, international relations and history. I feel not only justified in my opinions as a voter, but qualified in my criticisms as well, due to my capacity as a serious student of international relations theory and diplomatic history.
I have spent considerable effort and thought trying to formulate a personal philosophy of what America's role in the world should be. This is no easy task. America's foreign policy can be infuriatingly contradictory, whether a Republican is in power or a Democrat. There are parts of me, like America's foreign policy, that truly and deeply resemble that same foreign policy.
For example, I believe that most international problems have solutions. I believe in the idea of the perfectability of mankind. I believe in American "exceptionalism." I believe in peace, until we are threatened. I believe government should be as limited as possible, but that is has a role to play in making American society better. That is the crux of my "Americanism": I believe society can be made, not perfect, but better.
I have also traveled a great deal. I have seen shades of the world the vast majority of Americans will NEVER see, nor do they want to see it. Chinese peasants sleeping on mud floors, barefoot and dirty children harvesting bananas for our consumption in Belize, Turkish girls wearing veils and miniskirts (go figure) and nasty anti-American Europeans come to mind first. But I've also seen the rotting machines of death littered all across the landscape of the former Soviet Union, and the glittering new American machines of war in Tawainese and Korean airports. Finally and tragically, I've seen countries ravaged by civil wars and ethnic cleansing.
The world is not a pretty place outside the confines of Western Europe and North America.
Most Americans, as I said, will never see these sights, nor do they want to, nor should they, really. Prefering to live in their sheltered, gated communities, driving their large anti-social SUVs, and remaining ignorant of the world at large, they are us.
This is the immutable fact of American politics: we are a solipsistic people. Our lack of historical interest or perspective is a double-edged sword that sometimes leads us into places and situations we'd be advised to avoid. At other times, however, it animates those "better angels" of ours, the belief that we really can change the world. Sometimes, to the chagrin of cynical Old-World onlookers we succeed in doing just that. And this too, is us.
I, in my thoughts, am a microcosm of this reality, so completely American in my contradictions.
Assumptions and Theory
The entire post-Afghanistan phase of the "War on Terror" rests on the realities mentioned above. It also relies on two basic Bush Administration assumptions: the state as actor in international relations and RMA (the revolution in military affairs). Both are faulty, and the potential consequences grave.
The neoconservative theory that Wolfowitz, Cheney and Rumsfeld represent is a modern mutation of old-school realism. "Realism's" central tenet is that the state is the only actor of import in international affairs, that all actions in the international system are instigated and resolved by the state. Thus, neocons downplay and dismiss the role of non-state actors such as NGOs and international organizations like the WTO. They are also dismissive of globalization in all of its manifestations, promoting, often blindly, the role of "hard power", over that of our immense "soft-power", snidely dismissing it as "irrelevant".
The President's national security strategy is the finest, most pure and distilled pronouncement of neocon thought on record. All of its multi-lateral lip-service aside, its true essence is this: We will play by your rules until we do not want to.
But the one glaring problem with this blind, unreflective adherence to neocon theory is that we were not attacked by a STATE on September 11, 2001. We were attacked by a cruel, vicious, super-empowered NON-STATE actor.
Bad assumption number one: we wage war against state actors, while we were attacked by non-state actors. Not only is this a bad assumption, it is bad strategy.
Now, here is where the second faulty assumption comes in---that there has been an RMA (revolution in military affairs). There hasn't. Military affairs are at their very core about strategy and strategy, no matter all the blather about cyber-and-space-based war, is still the same: winning political, lasting, victories.
"In the post-Cold War period, the radical changes in political context--no superpower, which is to say peer, competitor--and the apparent promise of what may amount to a revolution in military affairs keyed to the exploitation of information technologies, combine to make conventional warfare the flavour of the era for the United States.
Whether or not the US armed forces can demonstrate a unique competence in information-led conventional combat will be affected by the willingness of America's opponents (emphasis added) to wage a style of war that allows the United States to obtain most from its comparative advantages in high technology, organization, and training."
We assume that we are still fighting against "conventional" enemies, all the "new kind of war" rhetoric notwithstanding. We also assume that our enemies will oblige us. And thus, as I wrote earlier:
“We had difficulty uprooting al Qaeda's cells globally, as erstwhile allies hesitated or set terms for their cooperation against it. . . . And so, for lack of clear targets and reliable allies, Washington decided to outflank the al Qaeda dilemma and go with U.S. strengths. In attacking a familiar, conventional, state target -- the second after Afghanistan -- it would redefine the terms of the U.S. war on al Qaeda. . . . Basically, the Bush Administration gambled the future of the War on Terrorism, on a war with Iraq."
In other words, the Bush Administration, because of its cavalier treatment of our allies pre-9/11, had little multilateral credibility with which to fight this "new kind of war" and were forced into choosing from several poor choices. This is the result of overreliance on neoconservative thought--forced to fight a new kind of war, in an old kind of way.
Finally, the Bush Administration's reliance on our conventional superiority and military victories leads it to ignore the central reality of the "War on Terror": The only victory worth having is a political victory--one that will end this conflict. This, sadly, is a legacy straight out of Vietnam. We never lost a battle, but we lost the war--because we ignored the political realities.
So here is bad assumption number two: substituting military victories for political ones, in the hopes that military exhaustion will end the conflict.
To be continued . . .
Posted by Sean-Paul @ 12/02/2002 08:57 PM
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Comments:
What I find most troubling about Bush administration policy, is it's utter and complete lack of patience.
This despite Dubyah's repeated claims to be a "patient man."
His actions, however, speak louder than his words.
He wants everything done now.
A winning strategy against terrorism, by definition, requires building political coalitions, good will, and taking a long term, concerted, concentrated approach.
I think Iraq is just a "throw in." The Bush administration is taking the opportunity 9/11 presented to settle an old score, once and for all.
It's not a "shift" in strategy, per se.
It's a sideshow.
And, the irony is, the reason why Saddam is such a high priority, is exactly BECAUSE the military solution works so well in that context. Iraq, almost uniquely, allows the U.S. military machine to play to its strengths.
Therefore, because it will be, in relative terms, a "piece of cake" to take Saddam out and depose the current Iraqi regime, it becomes an attractive target. It doesn't hurt that Iraq has incredible strategic value, and sits on the world's second largest proven oil reserves.
It's like a ripe piece of fruit, dangling from a sagging branch, tempting a famished man.
To invade iraq, an admittedly brutal and hostile regime, without adequate provocation, is the act of an agressive empire.
It's not the act of a great constitutional republublican superpower trying to enforce world order.
Hesoid, I like and agree with all you had to say. You overlooked one big factor, this invasion of Iraq is about stealing their oil. That is all it is about.
It isn't all about oil - the raison d'etre for deposing Saddam is to remove the threat of Iraqi WMDs and to show that America is willing to act in the region. Oil is a distant consideration to all of this. Nor is this a "rush to war." Kenneth Pollack wrote a very good piece in Foreign Affairs nearly *nine months ago* detailing the justifications for removing Saddam Hussein. Since then the US has been pursuing diplomatic means towards disarming Iraq (although those means are likely to fail in the end.) If we really just wanted Iraqi oil, we've had every ability to invade long before now. The "it's all about oil" argument is used all-too often and almost never well.
As for the issue of realism in IR, even al-Qaeda was entirely a non-state actor. They required the support of the Taliban (and the Pakistani ISI) to operate. They were funded by Saudi Arabia. Despite all the cries that non-state actors are gaining in importance, even terrorist groups require significant resources to pose a threat.
The lessons of Afghanistan also show that the use of military power is effective against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The attacks on Afghanistan decimated al-Qaeda's operational capability, and key members of the group are either dead or in US custody. Since then, al-Qaeda has only been able to attack targets of opportunity - places like Bali and Kenya where security is exceptionally lax.
The worst thing we can do is fail to prosecute the war on terror with anything less than our full force. What we learned from fighting al-Qaeda is that the "Arab street" reacts to strength. Rather than increase terrorism, the attacks on Afghanistan caused massive disillusionment among terrorist groups. al-Qaeda only gained strength in the late 90's when half-hearted US responses to major terrorist actions emboldened bin Laden. In other words, the best defense against terrorism is a strong offense.
Posted by: Jay Reding on December 3, 2002 03:21 PM
"It isn't all about oil - the raison d'etre for deposing Saddam is to remove the threat of Iraqi WMDs and to show that America is willing to act in the region."
The belief that "this is all about oil" seems to be a dogma rather than position. It's like trying to talk to a fundamentalist Christian about evolution - they simply counter very large, very obvious facts with false assumptions, faulty "evidence", and spurious logic. The anti-war movement is no longer about politics, it has become a secular religion that quotes from the Gospel of Noam Chomsky and spontaneously rejects anything that is considered apostasy to the cause.
If we wanted oil, there's any number of ways of getting it that are cheaper, easier, and less disruptive than going to war. In fact, if I were going to plot some diabolical scheme to steal Iraq's oil it most certainly wouldn't entail invading Iraq. Considering that Saddam Hussein would be glad to sell us his oil for cheap if it meant staying in power and developing weapons of mass destruction. Nor would such an theory explain why we didn't simply take over the oil fields ten years ago when we had a UN mandate for action and the rest of the world behind us.
Instead of arguing about the costs and risks of war, the left wants to keep beating the dead horse of some sinister conspiracy between the Big Evil Oil Companies(tm) and the Bush Administration. It's a view that's based on a fundamental unwillingness to engage in real debate on substantive issues, and it's why the anti-war movement is becoming increasingly marginalized.
Posted by: Jay Reding on December 3, 2002 05:37 PM
Jay,
You argue against the "oil thesis" from a commenter, but ignore the very good arguments of both Hesiod and Agonistes. That sounds like fighting the war(argument) you can win, rather than the war that needs to be fought.
"If we wanted oil, there's any number of ways of getting it that are cheaper, easier, and less disruptive than going to war. "
It would be better if you understood the "it's about oil" argument before criticizing it. It's never been about the U.S. having to *own* the world's oil. The U.S. only wants to control the *access* to oil for itself, its allies and its competitors.
Oil is not the only issue here, but it is a major one. Ignoring it or calling it a "conspiracy theory" are two methods of blinding yourself to reality.
Of course it is about Oil. Otherwise why would we rush to defend Kuwait with all our might when we ignored other 'invasions' in Africa for ever? Why did we not send our aircraft carriers off the African coast and start lobbing Patriots at the warring African factions?
Ah yes. Kuwait was invaded as opposed to Africa where nobody knows where the national boundaries were. Convenient? Certainly.
You yourself point out that our real conflict is with al Qaida, based in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. So why is Saddam suddenly so important?
I get it. It is because they were real close to building a nuclear weapon ten years ago.
