The Destabilization of Pakistan


The debate is heating up between those who favor and oppose sending more troops to Afghanistan. Put me in the latter camp - I cannot support escalation without first hearing a clear explanation of the strategic changes that would accompany the escalation, along with an explanation of how we'll address issues of government and development sector corruption. In other words, I think that pumping in more troops without addressing the structural flaws of our approach will yield no results. And since we're a long way away from solving those problems, I think we should hold off on troop increases.

Building an argument for or against more troops involves answering a number of questions. I'm only going to deal with one sub-point here, but it's an important one: we need to define more carefully what political and social consequences escalation in Afghanistan might have for Pakistan.

Buzz and Digg this story

One point that everyone on all sides of the debate loves to make is that x, y, or z maneuver by the US might "destabilize Pakistan." I think we're reaching a point where we can talk more precisely about what that means. It's easy to talk about "destabilization" - it's a nice buzzword that makes you sound authoritative, and an intimidating prospect to scare your audience or your opponents with. It's a bogeyman. I myself have used it that way in the past. Admittedly, "destabilization" can be shorthand for a range of phenomena that are understood by the parties involved in a debate, but I think in this case we need to bring our use of the word back to more concrete details. The debate about Afghanistan/Pakistan needs to be accessible to as many Americans as possible.

So let's go:

We could make a strong argument that various internal and external forces have already destabilized Pakistan. Politics are in turmoil as Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif seek Musharraf's impeachment; rumor has it that the president's resignation may come as soon as next week. Kashmir has seen a resurgence of violence and unrest, straining relations between Pakistan and India. Revelations of the Pakistani ISI's involvement in the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul have also damaged relations, with India adopting our rhetoric to accuse Pakistan of promoting terrorism. Ongoing conflicts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and provinces like Balochistan demonstrate the weakness of the central government in Pakistan; with over 135,000 people displaced because of fighting in the north, one could reasonably say that a low-level war is simmering between the Pakistani army and militants. Recurring waves of violence throughout the country, especially suicide bombings, also weaken the authority and legitimacy of the central government while creating an atmosphere of tension, uncertainty, and danger. Finally, US missile strikes in Pakistan undermine Pakistani sovereignty, fuel anti-Americanism, kill civilians, and often fail to produce measurable results in the "war on terror."

All of these developments constitute "destabilizing elements" in my opinion. So what would further destabilization look like? No one has a crystal ball, but it's imperative that people start saying more precisely what they are afraid of. The complete collapse of the central government? A military takeover? Civil war? If we know what we're afraid of, we can more easily take steps to avoid it.

We can also point out that destabilization is not like an on/off switch, where either a country is destabilized or it isn't, either it's Somalia or it's Sweden. We like to talk about countries "teetering on the brink," but in many cases it's more appropriate to talk about a "slide into chaos," ie movement along a continuum rather than one moment where everything falls apart. Even in Rwanda before the genocide there were warning signs that crisis was imminent. Even in Somalia the civil war took about three years to topple Siad Barre. So it's more realistic to talk about Pakistan disintegrating into civil war or brutal military authoritarianism over the course of several months or years rather than falling apart overnight. Can we describe what that might look like, and how we can minimize the chances of it happening?

Let me spell out what I'm afraid of. I think that an escalation that includes an increased American military presence in Pakistan will put Pakistani leaders, both civilian and military, in a very awkward position. That's especially true for civilian leaders whose main priority seems to be restoring mechanisms of accountability, reinstating judges, etc, and so while I can't predict what would happen I think Americans fighting inside Pakistan might become too much for the civilian leaders to deal with - and thus would tempt military leaders to intervene (not to fight us, but to stage a coup against the civilians). As for the American forces, I think we will find ourselves fighting not an expanded version of the war in Afghanistan, but a two-front war; even if they're all militants, the conflict in Pakistan will include its own special challenges in terms of geography, engagement with local populations and politics, etc. Moreover, the front in Pakistan will find us fighting alongside a military whose enthusiasm for cooperating with us, or fighting these militants in general, seems to be running rather low. That poses a number of problems and has the potential to create unfortunate incidents. We already exchange fire inadvertently with the Afghan military from time to time, increasing mistrust and tension; do we want to risk the same in Pakistan? The list of potential problems goes on and on.

Escalation in Afghanistan alone would pose fewer direct risks of igniting civil war or a military takeover in Pakistan, but it wouldn't help. First of all, given the aggressive and persistent assertions from the US side that militants using Pakistan as a base are to blame for the stalemate in Afghanistan (in my opinion there are other factors involved), escalation in Afghanistan may automatically lead to escalation in Pakistan. But even without that, the status quo in Afghanistan destabilizes Pakistan. How? By pumping massive amounts of American dollars into the shadiest corners of Pakistan in the name of "fighting terror." (That weakens the authority of the central government, especially civilians.) By discouraging negotiations between Pakistani leaders and militant groups. (That undermines Pakistan's sovereignty and perhaps prevents a real solution to internal Pakistani conflicts.) By distracting attention from critical issues like the resolution of the Kashmir crisis. (That risks greater tension between India and Pakistan.) Thus a surge in Afghanistan, without tackling these issues, would only exacerbate them.

What I'm trying to say are two things: One, Pakistan has already been destabilized to a substantial extent. Two, American escalation, especially escalation in Pakistan, risks the specific outcomes of increased internal conflict, increased violence, and decreased legitimacy for the central government.

Now, can the proponents of more troops please spell out exactly what consequences a lack of American escalation will produce in Pakistan? Then we'll be one step closer to a sophisticated debate.


Alex Thurston August 17, 2008 - 5:16pm
( categories: Opinion | Pakistan )

Unfortunately, with the current Mayberry Machiavelli administration in place, sophisticated debate is simply not possible. I think the whole mess with Georgia and Russia proves their intellectual and pragmatic laziness.

Now, produce a bar, several stools and a deaf bartender, and they'll gladly join in on a bar pounding competition.

If I had wanted cream and sugar, then why order the damn coffee?

Rook August 16, 2008 - 12:30pm

The US is muddying the water by failing to distinguish between a campaign and an occupation. The US won the Afghan and Iraq campaigns in days due to superior intelligence and firepower. However, it is struggling with the occupations because of political ineptitude and lack of proper police action. The US response to everything under W/Cheney and the neocons is in military terms -- campaign and military mop up.

The military is very successful at winning campaigns but not so good at mopping up after them, and it is not very well suited to dealing with occupations by itself, which require a much broader and deeper political approach to "winning hearts and minds." A chiefly military approach (weapons and whips) is guaranteed to alienate hearts and minds, which plays into the hands of the opposition. W has missed this completely, and have the US media, and McSame is bent on continuing and compounding mistakes already made and discredited.

tjfxh August 16, 2008 - 12:59pm

"I cannot support escalation without first hearing a clear explanation..."

This administration doesn't do explanations - sorry. They aren't big on details and the Commander in Chief doesn't understand English (his native language) well enough for detailed discussions.

"I think that pumping in more troops without addressing the structural flaws of our approach will yield no results."

Who said addressing the structural flaws was on the agenda? It's the structural flaws that make it worth their time. Especially the "government and development sector corruption" you mention.

They need a new surge. Iraq is basically over. The Iron Triangle needs profits. That's what this is about. They get profits by initiating conflicts (or fanning the flames of local conflicts until they can get directly involved), then contracting to provide the weapons and infrastructure for a military campaign.

For them, the "government and development sector corruption" is what makes it worth doing in the first place. Take away that, and they have no motivation to go into Afghanistan, or anywhere else for that matter.

They couldn't give a fat rat's butt about whether the local population is stabilized, or whether there's movement towards a democracy,

If there's movement towards a deregulated (or better yet, totally unregulated) market, then they are interested. Iraq was a dream come true for them - a totally unregulated, wide open market.

They are just looking for the next one.

I can imagine the fat round of snickering a post like yours gets between rounds of whiskey shots when these guys have lunch together.

They're like "haha - this guy thinks its about solving problems! Get a load of that! That's worth another round, bartender!"

I wish we had an administration that sees its role as solving problems.

Obama is trying to promise people that is what his administration would be like. But I have my doubts as to whether, even if he's sincere, he could actually achieve that given the intransigent metastasized corruption we now have in DC.

yogi-one August 17, 2008 - 7:36pm

But a post like this is also aimed at progressives who support troop increases in Afghanistan (and sometimes military intervention in Pakistan as well). More and more liberal hawks are coming out and pushing for escalation. I have no illusions that my ideas are going to find favor among policymakers, but at least within progressive communities I feel I should push back against the hawks. And it's not just because of principles - it's because I genuinely think escalation wouldn't help us "win" in Afghanistan.

www.theseminal.com

Alex Thurston August 17, 2008 - 11:56pm

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.