Ahmadinejad and Iran are making headlines as always, from the president's recent trip to Iraq to rumors of US-Iran talks in Iraq to an ongoing dispute over Iran's nuclear program, including Ahmadinejad's refusal yesterday to hold talks with the EU on the issue.

The treatment of Iran that we usually find in English-language media concentrates on Iran's foreign bluster, leaving our citizenry almost completely ignorant of internal dynamics within the borders of our "enemy." If we treat Iran as a black box, then it's easy to label them "Islamofascists" and other such nonsense, and it's easy to miss the fact that their rise as a regional power has been accompanied by internal corrosion of their economy. But if we take a closer look, we see that Iranian politics are deeply contested. As a potential political transition approaches, speculation is running rampant on whether change will occur.

On March 14th, Iran will hold parliamentary elections. Will they be free and fair? Yes and no. Apparently the real political disenfranchisement doesn't happen at the ballot box, but in the restrictions placed on who can run in the first place.

The hardliner-dominated Guardian Council blocked 1,700 candidates, leaving 4,500 in the race for the 290-seat legislature, according to official figures. Ahmadinejad opponents say many of their candidates were blocked and only about 200 remain in the running nationwide.

The council can bar any candidate it labels as not loyal enough to the principles of the 1979 Islamic revolution and strict interpretations of Islamic rule.

Former President Mohammad Khatami, a reformist who served from 1997-2005, warned last month that there would be no serious competition for the vote unless the ban on moderates was reversed.

Who benefits from disenfranchisement of reformists? Conservatives, especially the coalition group the United Front of Principlists - but not all of them are in Ahmadinejad's pocket.

The election to the 290-seat assembly, dominated by hardline conservatives who swept to power in the 2004 vote and went on to back Ahmadinejad's winning presidential bid the next year, will not directly affect foreign, oil or other major policies.

But the president's economic management, blamed for 19 percent inflation, has prompted many of his allies to become critical, even if analysts say members of parliament backed the spending policies that largely caused the price rises.

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Even if the Front wins the most seats, Ahmadinejad cannot expect an easy ride, partly because different factions and personalities within the Front are likely to start jockeying for position before the 2009 presidential race.

"There is room for very strong challenges from 'principle-ists' for the next election. This (vote) is a lot about the next presidential election," said one politician, barred from the running by a pre-election screening process.

The conservatives enjoy the backing of Ayatollah Khameini, who has also shown recent signs of distancing himself from Ahmadinejad. In January, the two broke over a law mandating that gap be supplied to rural villages, and the Ayatollah humiliated the president by overruling him publicly. It's possible, then, that the conservatives will wrestle power away from the president even as some appear to support him, especially because economic factors may demand a reorientation on their part no matter how stubborn Ahmadinejad is.

Ayatollah Khamenei has continued to back the conservatives despite Mr. Ahmadinejad’s disastrous economic performance. High inflation and unemployment, amid large profits from Iran’s oil, have caused disillusionment among the president’s supporters. Some political analysts say that even though these conservative politicians will hold power, practical considerations may cause them to moderate their stances. These analysts note that some supporters have already called on Mr. Ahmadinejad to moderate his economic and foreign policies.

Indeed, Khody Akhavi believes that pressures from all sides are making Ahmadinejad's position precarious. He describes Ahmadinejad as "caught between reformists and hardliners." He argues that Ahmadinejad's original election owed itself partly to turmoil and unpredictability, and notes that strong participation in Iranian elections may indicate the potential for a tipping of the balance against the president's allies.

Iran has held 27 elections since the 1979 Revolution, and Iranians participate in them, sometimes to a greater extent than U.S. citizens who vote in U.S. elections. Fifty-five percent of eligible voters turned out for the 2004 presidential election, the highest turnout in 36 years. Iran reported a 60 percent turnout in 2006 elections for local councils and the powerful Assembly of Experts, in which Ahmadinejad's allies suffered a crushing defeat after a majority of seats when to reformists and conservatives opposing him.

Still, the disenfranchisement of reformists and other outspoken challengers to the regime may mean that the change comes more from inside - in the form of a reshuffling of elites - than from outside. Regardless, Ahmadinejad may not survive 2009, despite his high profile on the world stage.

How should the US work this one? Well, first off we shouldn't. Interference in Iranian politics historically hasn't worked out well for us. Maybe we should back off the tough talk and kick out the last leg of Ahmadinejad's support at home. And if we're praying for any outcome, let's pray for an unpredictable and complex one - to show ourselves, and the world, that Iran wasn't quite the country we thought it was. The Iran of the future - young, urbanizing, and often markedly out of step with conservatives' visions of the country - may soon shatter the "axis of evil" image...though likely not in eight days.